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ABSTRACT 
 
MILITARISM AND WELFARE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 
A FUZZY SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Güneş, Erkan. 
MA, Department of Political Science and International Relations 
Supervisor : Assist. Prof. Mehmet Fatih Aysan 
 
August 2014, 77 pages 
 
Most of the Middle Eastern countries display a stark contrast with the developed 
world in terms of welfare efforts, but they also have qualitative differences among 
themselves. This study sheds light on the political economic conditions leading to 
good and poor welfare efforts in the Middle East, but with a particular emphasis on 
those having to do with the militaristic aspects of states. The analysis of causal 
relationships between different configurations of conditions and welfare efforts by 
states is carried out with a systematic method of inference making called the Fuzzy 
Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). For this comparison eight Middle 
Eastern countries – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Yemen – are selected based on their relevance to the topic and the availability of 
data.  
The model includes seven condition variables and two outcome variables. Social 
expenditure as of central government expenditure and social security coverage are 
both included as indicators for welfare effort, thus two separate fsQCA analyses are 
implemented with these two outcome variables. Outputs of the fsQCA analyses 
support the hypotheses asserting negative relationship between militarism and 
welfare efforts. Mostly, the absence of militaristic aspects such as high military 
expenditure, high amount of armed forces personnel and praetorian relationship 
between the military and the government are associated with good welfare efforts. 
Since this is a qualitative study, it does not provide explanation about the net effects 
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of each variable on the outcome. However, it could serve as a preliminary study that 
provides insights to future research about some spurious and significant factors. 
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ÖZ 
 
ORTADOĞU’DA MİLİTARİZM VE SOSYAL REFAH: BULANIK KÜME KARŞILAŞTIRMALI 
NİTELİKSEL ANALİZ 
 
Güneş, Erkan. 
MA, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı : Yar. Doç. Dr. Mehmet Fatih Aysan 
 
Ağustos 2014, 77 sayfa 
 
Sosyal refah çabaları konusunda birçok Ortadoğu ülkesi ile gelişmiş dünya arasında 
keskin bir farklılaşma gözlenirken, bu ülkerler kendi aralarında da bu konuda ciddi 
farklılıklar sergilemektedir. Bu çalışma, Ortadoğu ülkerlerinde sosyal refah çabalarının 
zayıf olmasına neden olan siyasi-ekonomik faktörlere odaklanmaktadır, ve bu 
faktörler arasında özellikle militarizm ile ilgili olanlar çalışmanın ana konusunu teşkil 
etmektedir. Bu konuyu ele alırken Bulanık Küme Niteliksel Karşılaştırmalı Analiz 
metodundan faydalanılmaktadır. Bu karşılaştırma için veri uygunluğu ve tezin ana 
konusuyla alakasına göre sekiz adet vaka seçilmiştir. Bunlar sırasıyla Cezayir, Mısır, 
Ürdün, Lübnan, Fas, Suriye, Tunus ve Yemen’dir.  
Bu analiz için oluşturulan model yedi koşul değişkeni ve iki sonuç değişkeninden 
oluşmaktadır. Sosyal refah harcamalarının toplam hükümet harcamaları içindeki payı 
ve sosyal güvenlik kapsamı sosyal refah çabalarının iki alternatif göstergesi olarak 
modele dahil edilmiştir, ve bundan dolayı bu iki sonuç değşikeni için iki farklı analiz 
yürütülmektedir. İki analizden elde edilen sonuçlar militarizm ile sosyal refah çabaları 
arasında negatif bir ilişki öngören hipotezleri destekler niteliktedir. Çoğunlukla yüksek 
askeri harcamalar, yüksek askeri personel oranı ve hükümet ile askeriye arasındaki 
karşılıklı bağımlılık gibi militarist özelliklerin yokluğu yüksek düzeyde sosyal refah 
viii 
 
çabaları ile birlikte gözlemlenmektedir. Bu çalışma niteliksel bir özellik taşıdığından 
her bir koşul değişkeninin sonuç değişkeni üzerindeki net etkisine dair bir açıklama 
getirmemektedir. Bununla birlikte, bu çalışma militarizm ile sosyal refah arasındaki 
ilişkiyi açığa çıkarmaya çalışacak olan daha ileri düzey çalışmalarda değişken seçimine 
yardımcı olacak ön bir çalışma olarak kullanılabilir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortadoğu, militarizm, sosyal politika, siyasi ekonomi 
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Introduction 
 
 
One possible answer to the question why the Arab people rose up against their rulers 
in the past several years could be the failure of governments to fulfill the social 
welfare demands of their societies. Apart from the factors like oppressive treatments 
of authoritarian regimes to societal groups and unfair elections, the great discrepancy 
between the developed world and the Arab countries –excluding wealthy Gulf 
monarchies— in terms of social welfare seems to be one of the fundamental sources 
of people’s grievance.  
Most of the Middle Eastern states perform below the world mean in terms of the 
extent and scope of social welfare provision.1 While this is the case for welfare 
indicators, one list in which majority of the Middle Eastern states rank quite higher 
than the world mean is the Global Militarization Index (GMI).2 A simple juxtaposition 
of the two pictures arises questions regarding the relevance of their militaristic 
aspects with their poor performances in terms of welfare provision.  
The general landscape of welfare provision in the world illustrates the significant role 
of countries’ economic capacity on their state’s welfare provision efforts. Data from 
2009 indicates that on average high income countries’ total public social security 
expenditure amounted to 19.4% of their Gross Domestic Products (GDP), while 
middle and low income countries respectively spent 7% and 4.1% of their GDPs.3 
These facts suggest a significant correlation between income level and social policy 
                                                          
1 See Randa Alami & Massoud Karshenas (2012, February). Deficient Social Policies Have Helped 
Spark the Arab Spring. Retrieved from School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London: 
https://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/file74447.pdf 
 
2 See Global Militarization Index. (n.d.). Retrieved from Bonn Intenational Center for Conversion: 
http://gmi.bicc.de/ 
 
3 See The International Labour Organization. (2011). World Social Security Report 2010/11: Providing 
Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond. Geneva. Retrieved from 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_213759.pdf , p. 3. 
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performances. However, low and middle income countries’ poor performance could 
not be reduced to their economic capacity. This work argues there should be space 
for political factors in explaining the variation between the developed and less-
developed word, and also the variation among the members of the same income 
level.  
In an environment of persistent inter-state and intra-state conflicts, many Middle 
Eastern states spend extravagant amounts on military personnel and equipment. 
Excluding the natural resource abundant Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, 
Middle Eastern countries have limited economic capacity, and this military burden on 
central government budgets might have significant consequences on well-being of 
citizens. Excessive military burden might be a barrier in front of the flow of public 
resources to social welfare and productive investments. 
This work will analyze this issue by elaborating on the status of military in the political 
economic systems of Middle Eastern countries, and will attempt to answer the 
question in which ways the militaristic aspects of their systems might constraint or 
enable welfare efforts by the governments. To reveal the dynamics of this issue, the 
study employs a comparative approach. The analysis is carried out with a systematic 
method of inference making called the Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(fsQCA). It is a set theoretical and qualitative technique, and therefore it is based on 
a configurational understanding of causation. Conclusions of the study will put 
forward which configurations lead to good or poor welfare efforts. For this 
comparison eight Middle Eastern countries – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen – are selected based on their relevance to the 
topic and the availability of data. Further information on why other Middle Eastern 
states are not included in the study are given in the second chapter that elaborates 
on research design and methodology.    
The whole study revolves around the relationship between the two phenomena 
represented by the concepts of militarism and welfare efforts. Before the analysis, 
the meaning of these concepts should be clarified. A simple definition of militarism 
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frames it as “aggressive military preparedness”.4 It might propel public policy makers 
to channel excessive amount of resources to military spending, to mobilize a great 
amount of people for military service, and might lead to unbalanced civil-military 
relations. In one of the earliest and one of the most profound definitions, Alfred Vagts 
describes a militarist polity as a setting where “a vast array of customs, interests, 
prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies and wars” are observed and 
“yet transcending true military purposes”.5 This second definition captures well the 
abnormal and harmful nature of the phenomenon. On the other hand, the concept 
of welfare efforts could be defined as the sum of actions by governments to fulfill 
their welfare responsibilities to society. T.H. Marshall’s definition of social rights 
succinctly designates these responsibilities:  
The right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share 
to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according 
to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely 
connected with it are the educational system and the social services.6    
 
The most common indicator for measuring welfare efforts is social spending as of 
Gross Domestic Product or as of central government spending. An additional 
indicator could be the level of social security coverage that is very likely to have a 
strong correlation with the first indicator.   
This work offers several hypotheses about the relationship of the two phenomena in 
the Middle Eastern context. Firstly, a high level of military spending as of central 
government spending has a negative relationship with welfare efforts of 
governments. Allocation of excessive public resources to military expenses narrows 
the share of budget available for welfare expenses. Secondly, the size of military 
personnel relative to the size of the total employment primarily has a constraining 
effect on welfare efforts, but in some cases it might have a contributory effect. Out 
                                                          
4 See Daron Acemoğlu & Pierre Yared (2010). Political Limits to Globalization. American Economic 
Review, 100(02), p.83. 
5 See Alfred Vagts. (1959). A History of Mlitarism: Civilian and Military. New York: Meridian Books. 
P.13.   
 
6 See Thomas H. Marshall. (1964). Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press. p.79. 
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of the risks military profession poses to human life and well-being, military personnel 
are provided with comprehensive welfare programs. When the ratio of military 
personnel to population is significantly high, more people benefits from the welfare 
programs provided by military, and that increases the legitimacy of governments’ 
military spending policies, which in turn makes them less in need of deriving political 
legitimacy through social spending on the rest of the society. Finally, a praetorian 
relationship between the military and the government negatively affects latter’s 
welfare efforts. Military absorbs extravagant public resources, in turn it provides 
security to the regime against domestic and external threats. These are the 
characteristics about armies that are present in the Middle Eastern countries with 
different configurations. This work argues the variation between the Middle Eastern 
states in terms of the abovementioned aspects of militarism might provide an 
explanation for the variation in their social welfare efforts.  
This work consists of three chapters. The first one focuses on three topics related 
with the inquired relationship. The role militaristic aspects of states play in the 
emergence of fundamental political economic outcomes like economic growth and 
development, the formers’ relationship particularly with welfare efforts of states, 
and the dynamics of social policy in the Middle East are elaborated on and 
remarkable works focusing on those topics are briefly reviewed to locate this study 
within the subfield of political economy. The second chapter is devoted to research 
design, methodology and data. Indicators for welfare efforts and variables 
considered to have effects on them are introduced. Subsequently, the underlying 
causal approach and procedures of the fsQCA technique are described in detail. 
Finally, information about the collection and features of the data are provided. In the 
third chapter, firstly the raw data for all variables are given in tables, and then they 
are converted into fuzzy set membership scores that indicate a case’s degree of 
displaying a condition or outcome. The outputs of the fsQCA analyses that are 
produced by the software follows these two steps, and finally the results of the 
analysis are commented and also complemented with a comparative analysis of three 
individual cases.    
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Chapter 1 
Militarism and Political Economic Outcomes 
 
 
A consensus on the meaning and scope of the term “political economy” could not 
have been achieved yet, however usually a contemporary social scientific study might 
bear these words in its title out of mainly two reasons. It might deal with a subject 
matter which falls into the intersection of politics and economics, or it might borrow 
the formal methodological tools of mainstream economics to model dynamics lying 
under a political phenomenon.7 Scholarly works from the classical literature of 
political economy published in the 19th and early 20th centuries studying the 
coevolution of novel economic and political systems could be counted among the 
typical examples for the former style.8 The latter tradition is a more recent endeavor 
of dealing with political phenomena, and it benefits from the mathematical tools of 
economists for modeling the issues like democratization, inter-state conflict, 
institutional change etc.9 The former one is the most common way of using it, and 
this work for the most part embraces that way, because the main research question 
revolves around a typical issue which could not be analyzed isolated from politics or 
economics.  
The relationship between militarism and welfare efforts within the contexts of 
Middle Eastern states is the main focus of this work, and it will be an attempt to reveal 
the dynamics of the former’s effect on the latter one. While welfare related topics 
have been most commonly studied within the mainstream social policy studies, 
                                                          
7 See Barry R. Weingast, Donald A. Wittman (2006). The Reach of Political Economy. In B. R. 
Weingast, & D. A. Wittman, The Oxford Hanbook of Political Economy (pp. 3-28). New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc.  
 
8 Joseph Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Karl Marx’s Das Kapital and Daron 
Acemoğlu’s Why Nations Fail are among the typical examples 
 
9 For a typical example, see Norman Schofield (2008). The Political Economy of Democracy and 
Tyranny. München: Oldenbourg. 
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which to a certain extent has achieved to isolate itself as a separate social scientific 
discipline, the inclusion of militarism in the research question necessitates a political 
economic approach which mainly deals with the implications of political power on 
political economic outcomes.10 Given this nature of the research question, this work 
will be among the ideal examples of a political economic study. 
 This study is related with several literatures in the subfield of political economy. 
Firstly, it focuses on the guns vs. butter problem, therefore it is related with the 
general literature on the effects of military costs on fundamental political economic 
outcomes like economic growth, distribution of wealth, volume of trade etc. 
Secondly, it has a specific concern on welfare efforts, and that feature includes it 
among the works inquiring the relationship between militaristic aspects of states and 
their social policy performances. Finally, it is a study only focusing on the region of 
the Middle East. There is a growing body of works on the topic of social policy in this 
part of the world, but they mostly concentrate on individual cases. This work with its 
comparative analysis of the eight cases could contribute to this literature by making 
researchers familiar with region-wide dynamics of social policy making.  
This chapter will shed light on these three issues and make a brief review of the 
discussions around them. The next section elaborates on the complex relationship 
between militarism and general economic outcomes. The following two sections are 
dedicated to the review of the other two more specific issues.  
 
1.1. A Political Economic Approach on Militarism 
 
In modern history, the overburden of military on the political economic outcomes 
arguably became most evident in the early 20th century when European great powers 
were occupied with waging a total war, namely the First World War. They depleted 
an enormous amount of their productive resources, but after the war they could flex 
their productive muscles again with the help of the United States of America. The US 
                                                          
10 See Chris Holden. (2005). Social Policy and Political Economy: A Tale of (at least) Two Disciplines. 
Social Policy and Society, 4(02), 173-182.  
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was a latecomer to the war field, but it also consumed enormous financial resources 
for a swift mobilization of military personnel and war machines. It is estimated 
around 4.7 million Americans served during the US involvement in the war, and the 
total cost of that involvement amounted to 52.2% of the Gross National Product.11 
However, interestingly it was able to achieve an economic boom just after the end of 
the war, while the European powers, both the victorious and defeated ones, were 
undergoing a harsh economic situation.  
In the early years of the war, the US was absent in the war field and were supplying 
weapons to Allied Powers, and in the aftermath of the war it was the financer of the 
post-war European infrastructural development and the main supplier of the post-
war European demand for industrial goods. These were significant contributory 
factors behind the emergence of the USA as the greatest industrial power of the 20th 
century. It was able to allocate most of its resources – as it should be during the 
normal times of a modern economy at the time— to industrial production, while its 
rivals in the industrial competition crucially ran out of productive resources and were 
using the available stock for the treatment of war destruction, but not for innovative 
industrial production. By the late 1920s the US was supplying almost 40% of the world 
demand for industrial goods, and the sum of the production by the Western 
European countries and the United Kingdom, who were the leading industrial actors 
of the 18th and 19th centuries, was almost 35% of the world demand.12 These different 
outcomes produced under similar conditions of military burden suggests there 
should be some contextual differences in this success and failure of the west and east 
coasts of the North Atlantic. When combined with different contextual variables 
excessive military mobilization could be a cause both for blossom and wither of an 
economy. A simple binary comparison of this two historical experiences by two 
different parts of the western world reveals that they did not share a similar political 
economic situation before and during the war. The US had been emerging as a hub 
                                                          
11 See Hugh Rockoff. (2004, June). Until It's Over, Over There: The U.S. Economy in World War I. 
Retrieved from National Bureau of Economic Research: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10580.pdf?new_window=1 , p.19.  
 
12 See Robert C. Allen. (2011). Global Economic History: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc. p.7.  
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for innovative industrial production towards the end of the 19th century, while the 
others had gradually been getting stuck in a fierce military competition. When this 
competition resulted in a war in the early 20th century, the continental supply of 
weapons were not sufficient in Europe and the USA were ready in terms of industrial 
infrastructure to become an exporter of weapons, in other words it turned weaponry 
into a business. From this picture it seems the flow of big financial capital through 
arms sales both to the US military and European powers, and the triggering effect of 
the huge demand for weaponry on the research and development activities in 
military and related industries created a fertile context for the domination of positive 
effects of militarism over its negative effects.    
After the Second World War, European powers could have decreased their military 
mobilization to normal levels, and then they experienced a sharp increase in terms of 
the average socioeconomic status of their population. In that period, with the 
increasing tensions between the US and the USSR, the former continued to consume 
huge amounts of its financial resources to the development of its military, but its 
huge economy and its ability to make profit from the arms industry made it able to 
finance its democratic militarism.    
This extravagant military mobilization is still observed to a more modest degree in 
the Middle East. Militaries have been taking the lion’s share from the state budgets 
in most of the Middle Eastern countries, however this has not been the case because 
they have been continuously warring states, but because they have been enjoying an 
exclusive position within the political economic structures. The surrounding 
conditions in these countries seem to contribute to the dominance of negative effects 
of militarism on economic growth and development. Excessive financial resources are 
spent for the imports of expensive military equipment or for the expenses of armed 
forces personnel. The weakness of domestic industries in terms of technological 
research and development is a barrier in front of the emergence of positive 
externalities of excessive military expenditure. Additionally, the recruitment of a 
considerable share of labour force in the military is a factor preventing the blossom 
of a productive private sector, and this channels another negative impact of 
militarism on the economic development.    
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These stories illustrate the complexity of the relationship between militarism and 
political economic outcomes, mainly the economic growth and development. Deger 
and Sen (1995)13 navigate through this complexity and theorize a comprehensive list 
of causal channels through which the militaristic aspects of states might affect 
economic growth. Besides, their work also provides insights about militarism’s effects 
on other political economic outcomes. They introduce nine channels with varying 
directions of influence on the outcomes. Among them some remarkable ones are the 
resource allocation channel, aggregate demand creation channel, budgetary 
crowding-out channel and growth spinoffs channel.14 The first one conduces a 
negative effect on economic growth since the aggregate investment level decreases 
as the military expenditure increases. The second one is the classical Keynesian 
demand creation mechanism through increasing government spending. If there exists 
a domestic arms industry and a large amount of people recruited by the military, then 
military expenditure might contribute to short term economic growth. The third 
channel points out the reduced government spending on health and education as a 
result of the increasing military expenditure. Health and education spending 
contributes to individual’s efforts for human capital formation and that is argued to 
consist a fundamental driving force of economic growth. Finally, the growth spinoffs 
channel draws attention to possible positive externalities which militaristic aspects 
of a political economy might create on the modernization of industries and 
technological development.15 This last one refers to the Benoit hypothesis that 
asserts a positive relationship between militarism and economic growth in the 
context of developing countries. His arguments mainly revolves around the 
contribution of a high level of military mobilization on the processes of research and 
development in the industry.16 
                                                          
13 See  Saadet Deger &  Somnath Sen. (1995). Military Expenditure in Developing Countries. In K. 
Hartley, & T. Sandler, Handbook of Defense Economics, Volume 1 (pp. 270-302). Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
 
14 Ibid, p.279. 
   
15 Ibid, p.280. 
  
16 See Emile Benoit (1973). Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books,  Emile Benoit (1978), Growth and Defense in Developing Countries, Economic  
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As the aforementioned story from the early 20th century and theoretical insights by 
Deger and Sen (1995) suggest the relationship is hardly reducible to a simple 
unidirectional effect of militarism on political economic outcomes. This complex 
nature of the relationship reverberates in the literature as contradictory conclusions 
by different works about the direction of it. Bowman describes this situation in the 
literature with the words: “While the conventional wisdom and the case study 
evidence conclude that large militaries are negatively associated with development, 
a large body of cross-national research finds that lots of soldiers are good for 
economic growth and equity in developing countries”.17 This sentence summarizes 
well the state of the literature on the political economy of militarism, and also 
indirectly points out the theoretical and methodological roots of the division.18 
In a period of high political tension around the globe and of arms race between the 
two great powers in the context of the Cold War, the nature of this relationship was 
one of the most debated political economic questions. Benoit’s works in 1973 and 
1978 have been the forerunner of those arguing positive influence of military 
expenditure on economic growth. The mechanism producing this effect in his study 
were human capital improvements thanks to the disciplined education provided by 
the military and increased level of research and development activities.19 Benoit’s 
argument subtly claim that militarism is good for economic growth, because a higher 
level of military expenditure, which is the most common and fundamental proxy 
variable for militarism, means also greater positive effect on growth. Another 
remarkable study from this period was DeGrasse’s analysis of military spending and 
economic performance in the United States. Similar to Benoit’s analysis, this one also 
                                                          
Development and Cultural Change, 26 (02), 271-280.  
 
17 See Kirk S. Bowman (2002). Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of 
Praetorianism in Latin America. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. p.3.  
 
18 The following two articles discuss the effects theoretical framework and methodology preferences 
on the conclusions regarding the nature of the relationshipAynur Alptekin & Paul Levine. (2012). 
Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 
28(04), 636-650, Sefa Awaworyi & Siew L. Yew (2014). The Effect of Military Expenditure on Growth: 
An Empirical Synthesis. Retrieved from Monash University, Business and Economics: 
http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/research/papers/2014/2514effectawaworyiyew.pdf 
 
19 See Emile Benoit. (1978). Growth and Defense in Developing Countries. Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 26(02), 271-280. 
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found a positive relationship, and according to this analysis the effect flows through 
the channel of increased job opportunities with the increased military mobilization 
and the resulting increase in the buying power and ultimately in aggregate demand.20 
The popularity of the modernization theory at the time was influential in the 
formation of the framework researchers employing to analyze development related 
questions. Militaries were seen as a tool for swift and effective modernization in 
education and technology for Third World countries, therefore high military 
expenditure were beneficial to economic progress for them.21   
With the end of the Cold War this question has become even more popular. In the 
two decades after the collapse of this international order, many works in mainstream 
economics and political science have been published on this issue. These works 
produced different results about the relationship, but still a considerable majority 
found a positive relationship. The significant decrease in the level of tension was 
accompanied with a decrease in military spending in the US, Russia and their former 
satellite states, however this trend did not last long because of the conflicts in the 
Middle East, particularly for the US.22 This variation in military spending has created 
a better empirical ground for testing hypotheses about the guns vs. butter 
arguments. Some significant works published early in this period were Weede (1992), 
Bullock and Firebaugh (1990) and Arias (1994).23 The results of the first two indicated 
positive effects of militaristic aspects on development, while the last one argued a 
negative effect.  
                                                          
20 See Robert W. DeGrasse. (1983). Military Expansion, Economic Decline: The Impact of Military 
Spending on U.S. Economic Performance. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
21 See Samuel P. Huntington. (1957). The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 
 
22 For a detailed survey of the issue, see  James M. Cypher. (1991). Military Spending After the Cold 
War. Journal of Economic Issues, 25(02), 607-615. 
 
23See Erich Weede. (1992). Military Participation, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality. In S. 
Chan, & A. Mintz, Defense, Welfare and Growth (pp. 211-230). London: Routlegde. 
          Oscar Arias. (1989). 1987 Address to the United States Congress . In M. Edelman, & J. Kenan, 
The Costa Rica Reader. New York: Grove Weidenfeld. 
          Brad Bullock., & Glan Firebaugh. (1990). Guns and Butter? The Effect of Militarization on 
Economic and Social Development in the Third World. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 
18(02), 231-266. 
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One popular concept having to do with this issue and that was coined in this 
productive period of the literature was “peace dividend”. It was originally popularized 
by the US President George H. W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 
and was addressing positive economic yields obtained from significant cuts in 
defense spending by Western nations after the Cold War. The following words from 
a formal treatment of the concept summarizes the significance and underlying 
mechanisms of peace dividend arguments:  
[…] the effect of reduced defense budgets is interpreted as a type of  
investment process. In such a process the immediate effects are costs, in the 
form of unemployment of resources and various conversion costs, while the 
ultimate effects are benefits, as the unemployed are resources are 
reemployed using the market mechanism, to produce civilian goods. With this 
interpretation, the peace dividend is only a myth if it refers to immediate 
benefits derived without cost from reduced defense budgets, but it is a reality 
if it refers to the ultimate benefits from using markets to convert military 
production to civilian production.24 
 
Here, the emphasis is on the diversion of resources from military to other public 
expenses that are expected to generate more benefit for the society. Abu-Bader and 
Abu-Qarn (2003) focus on three cases from the Middle East for inquiring the effect of 
excessive use of public resources for military purposes. Their multivariate analysis of 
military spending and long-term economic growth in Israel, Syria and Egypt for a 
period around 30 years finds a negative relationship between the two.25Among other 
endeavors attempting to make sense of the relationship one comprehensive study is 
Bowman’s Militarization, Democracy and, Development: The Perils of Praetorianism 
in Latin America that also founds a negative relationship.26 Another remarkable work 
in the literature of political economy of militarism, but with a different dependent 
variable is Acemoğlu and Yared’s (2010) analysis of militarism and trade volume. They 
empirically found that in the last 20 years up to 2010, the countries experiencing 
                                                          
24 See Michael D. Intriligator. (n.d.). The Concept of A Peace Dividend. Retrieved from UNESCO-
EOLSS: http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c13/E6-28A-02-04.pdf , p.1.  
 
25 See  Suleiman Abu-Bader & Aamer S. Abu-Qarn. (2003). Government Expenditures, Military 
Spending and Economic Growth: Causality Evidence from Egypt, Israel and Syria. Journal of Policy 
Modelling, 25(06), p.579. 
 
26 See Kirk S. Bowman. (2002). Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of 
Praetorianism in Latin America. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press. 
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increasing militarism – measured by the proxy indicators like military spending and 
the size of military— have performed poor in terms of the growth in their trade 
volume.27        
One common feature of the majority of works cited until now is their methodological 
orientation. They all inquire for the existence of a correlational relationship between 
military expenditure and economic growth or related outcomes by analyzing data. 
The lack of consensus among them in terms of the existence of a significant 
relationship or the direction of it stems from several factors. Firstly, they use different 
samples of cases for their cross-national analyses. The trend is testing hypotheses 
with a sample derived from countries in a specific region such as Latin America or 
East Europe. Since the quantitative methods generally ignores contextual differences 
between regions, contradictory results for bivariate or multivariate relationship are 
not rare. Secondly, their economic growth models differ and that in turn might affect 
the results obtained from the same data. Definitional differences or the choice of 
indicators might result in contradictory results, as well.   
Qualitative studies generally have a complex understanding of causality, therefore 
the role of contextual differences are treated better. However, the issue of militarism 
and economic outcomes are not handled in a systematic way in qualitative tradition. 
This study embraces a qualitative understanding of causality that brings a 
configurational explanation to relationships, and uses a methodology that 
systematizes this complex and context dependent causality. The contradictory results 
of the works cited until now might arise out of their ambitious endeavor to explain 
this very complex relationship in simple terms.  
Another common problem within the literature is equating the definition of 
militarism with the excessive defense expenditure. As mentioned before, while high 
defense expenditure is the foremost indicator of militarism, there are also other 
mechanisms that might channel the effect of militarism towards the political 
economic outcomes. A high ratio of the military personnel to the population or to the 
labour force of a country, though it has not totally independent from the defense 
                                                          
27See  Daron Acemoğlu & Pierre Yared. (2010). Political Limits to Globalization. American Economic 
Review, 100(02), p.88.  
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expenditure, could be counted as another significant indicator for militarism. Mutual 
exclusiveness between explanatory variables in terms of their effect on the outcome 
is not a sine qua non in qualitative methods. Two variable displaying significant 
correlation might hinder to measure net effects by each of them, but in a 
configurational explanation for the presence and absence of a certain outcome these 
two variables could take place in the same combination. Military expenditure and 
military personnel have such a feature. A country having a high level of armed forces 
personnel is very likely to have a high level of military personnel too, or vice versa. 
Military personnel might have different channels of effect on political outcomes than 
military expenditure. Additionally, a case might have a high level of military 
expenditure, but low level of military personnel, and the former might be present out 
of expenses on equipment. Therefore, this study will include these two variables as 
two aspects of militarism.   
Apart from the empirical works mentioned until now, a policy making perspective on 
this issue might provide further insights to understand the functioning of militarism 
within the political economic structures of states and the effects it produces on 
political economic outcomes. Policy making in modern states is a complex process 
whether it takes place in a democratic or non-democratic ground. In highly 
institutionalized democracies, a certain policy is finalized most often as a result of a 
multitude of interactions between the government, bureaucracy and societal actors. 
Concerns of representation and accountability necessitates the consent of people or 
at least of their representatives, and that creates a significant transaction cost 
towards the formulation and implementation of policies. In non-democratic or semi-
democratic contexts this process is less constrained by these concerns, however 
some influential societal or state actors might lead to significant costs by creating 
biases that result in inefficiencies in the final outcomes. In militaristic and 
authoritarian contexts of Middle Eastern states, priorities of military and security 
policy domain are privileged over others. The allocation of resources for the expenses 
of each policy domain in such a context is likely to cause inefficient outcomes in 
economic growth or equity.   
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Institutional approaches on political economy of public policy making facilitates to 
understand the underlying mechanisms creating these biases. Acemoğlu, Johnson 
and Robinson’s model for explaining the emergence of different types of institutions 
and their effects on economic growth offers a very simple framework to understand 
how militarism affects political economic outcomes. In their theory, the initial 
allocation of political power among various actors of a polity determines the type of 
future political and economic institutions, which they see as the most fundamental 
factor explaining the variation in economic growth and development. These 
institutions constraint or enable policy makers and individuals in their actions.28 An 
important aspect of their theory is the distinction between de jure and de facto 
political power. In Middle Eastern countries constitutions do not give de jure political 
power to militaries, but given their critical role in the formation processes of nation 
states, they usually enjoy considerable de facto political power whereby military 
priorities and norms are institutionalized.   
This institutional perspective is very popular in the literature of political economy of 
economic growth and development, but also could be benefited for understanding 
the emergence of different social policies. This work is not an institutionalist account 
of welfare efforts in the Middle East, but this perspective is given here as a highly 
relevant explanation for revealing the mechanisms of militarisms effect on political 
economic outcomes.    
 
1.2. Militarism and Social Policy Dynamics 
 
The budgetary crowding out effect29 introduced in the previous section is the most 
relevant analytical tool to make sense of the relationship between militarism and 
social policies of states. A high percentage of military spending as of central 
                                                          
28 See Daron Acemoğlu, Simon Johnson, & James A. Robinson. (2005). Institutions as the 
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth. In P. Aghion, & S. N. Durlauf, Handbook of Economic 
Growth (pp. 385-472). Amsterdam: North-Holland. p. 392 
 
29 It is one of the nine channels introduced by them, and the one that implies the budgetary tradeoff 
between the security and welfare policy domains.  
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government spending directly narrows the proportion of resources that could be 
allocated to social spending. While this is the most salient and usually most dominant 
effect, there are other channels that could have positive effects on welfare efforts of 
state.  
In contexts where formal employment are limited and mostly concentrated in public 
sector, a citizen employed in a state office or public enterprise is by far more likely to 
get social security coverage. Since a higher level of military personnel means a higher 
level of public employees too, this aspect of militarism sometimes might contribute 
to welfare efforts by states. Particularly, in the early phases of state formation many 
people benefit from state’s welfare provision through their entitlements in the 
military. Skocpol’s groundbreaking analysis of the emergence and expansion of social 
benefits in the United States in the late 19th century found their roots in the military 
mobilization for Union Civil War. In Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political 
Origins of Social Policy in the United States, she illustrates how hard conditions of war 
propel states to behave more generous to warring citizens and how these behavior 
is institutionalized as citizen rights after the hard times had passed.30  
Empirical works on this more specific issue is less common compared to the more 
general one in the previous section. However, since the income level of a country 
matters much for social policies of the state, this literature provides insights about 
the outcome of welfare efforts, as well. When the dependent variable is economic 
growth, the relevance of budgetary crowding-out has to do with its influence on 
human capital investment and infrastructural development. High military burden 
might narrow down state’s capability to help citizens’ human capital formation, and 
this ultimately might lead to decrease in economic growth. Also, public investment 
for infrastructural development, that is almost a necessary condition for sustainable 
economic growth, might decrease since the military burden might crowd out public 
spending on investments that could not be carried out solely by the private sector 
such as the construction of roads, telecommunication infrastructure or railroads. On 
the outcome of welfare efforts, as proxied by social spending or social security 
                                                          
30 See Theda Skocpol. (1995). Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in 
United States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
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coverage, crowding out has a more direct effect through decreasing share in the 
central budget for state’s use in social policy domain.  
Some works focusing on this more specific issue generally choose social spending or 
a closely related phenomenon as the dependent variable. A sophisticated research 
by Henderson (1998) finds a negative association between military expenditure and 
poverty, but points out declined social welfare spending as a reason why military 
spending leads to this outcome. In this study the relationship is also analyzed by 
disaggregating military spending into operations and maintenance (O&M), and 
research and development (R&D), but this does not change the conclusion.31 Töngür 
and Elveren (2012) focus on different welfare state regimes and inquire if there is any 
association between military spending and the type of the regime. Their findings 
indicate the emergence of social democratic welfare states which are known with 
their very high level of welfare efforts are negatively affected by high military 
expenditure.32 Another empirical study, by Yıldırım and Sezgin (2002), analyzes 
military expenditure’s effects on two components of social spending –respectively 
health and education spending – with data from Turkey’s republican era. They 
conclude that while there were a negative trade-off between military and health 
spending, the trade-off is positive between military and education spending.33 In 
contrast to the first issue covered in the previous section, the finding of various 
studies is more consistent for militaristic aspects’ effect on welfare efforts.  
On this issue of military spending vs. social spending one important topic that is not 
touched upon sufficiently in the empirical literature is the use of social spending as a 
source of political legitimacy. It is particularly important for regimes in their early 
formation phase and for those who suffer from the lack of democratic or rational 
legitimacy in general. This issue is left mostly to literature of state formation and 
                                                          
31 See Errol A. Henderson. (1998). Military Spending and Poverty. The Journal of Politics, 60(02), 
p.503 
 
32 See Ünal Töngür, & Adem Y. Elveren. (2012, December). Military Expenditures, Inequality, and 
Welfare and Political Regimes: A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis. Retrieved from Economic Research 
Center: http://www.erc.metu.edu.tr/menu/series12/1210.pdf 
 
33 See Jülide Yıldırım & Selami Sezgin. (2002). Defence, Education and Health Expenditures in Turkey, 
1924-96. Journal of Peace Research, 39(05), 569-580. 
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political legitimacy. In the classical tripartite view developed by classical figures of 
modern political philosophy such as Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber, states are 
entitled with three basic functions: internal and external security, representation of 
people in the political realm, and the provision of welfare and wealth.34 Thus, political 
legitimacy of rulers in a modern state depends on these three inputs.  
Weak states usually fail to fulfill these functions sufficiently. Some might be failing in 
all three, while some others might be failing only in one of them. A typical example 
for the latter situation is the resource abundant rentier states. They do sufficiently 
good in terms of security and welfare, but they usually ignore representation 
function. To offset this deficiency they sometimes resort to repression, but also try 
to increase their legitimacy through generous welfare provision that they finance 
with natural resource rent, and achieve to keep their weakness at sustainable levels. 
Authoritarian regimes that do not enjoy the luxury of excessive resource rent are not 
able to spend much on welfare provision, therefore they could not derive as much 
legitimacy as their resource abundant counterparts from the welfare function. They 
face a critical trade-off between their security and welfare budgets, but they usually 
tend to prefer the former and channel excessive resources to military and police. This 
exacerbates their legitimacy crisis, but they tend to respond this situation by 
allocating more resources for security.      
 
 
1.3. Social Policy Making in the Middle East 
 
Welfare efforts by Middle Eastern states have been under influence of many 
domestic and external factors. Economic capacities of states, ideological orientations 
of regimes, level of vulnerability to social risks in the society, the size of public sector 
relative to private sector or forces of globalization are among more significant ones. 
To a certain extent the poor state of social policies in the region could be explained 
                                                          
34 See Rolf Schwarz (2008). The Political Economy of State-Formation in the Arab-Middle East: 
Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization. Review of International Political Economy, 
15(4). p.602.  
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with these variables, but a study ignoring the phenomenon of militarism, a political 
feature that is more particular to this region, will have a limited explanatory capacity. 
A summary account of the general state of social policies in the region by Rana Jawad 
states:  
[...] social policy exists in the Middle East in a truncated form, squeezed by the 
taxing climate of militarism and globalisation. At the heart of this difficult 
situation is the propensity for hostile confrontation between most Middle 
Eastern states and the societies they govern, which reaches its most acute 
expression in the competition with Islamic social groups over control of the 
public sphere.35 
 
These words from a prominent expert of social policy dynamics in the Middle East 
points out particularities of the region, but also the centrality of militarism for states’ 
social policy performances.   
Unlike the developed world, social policies in this region have not been based on 
norms of citizenship or workers’ rights,36 but for the most part were a component of 
state-building processes or a response to pressures from society during periods in 
which regimes were suffering from a low level of legitimacy.37   
One remarkable historical dynamic that forced serious cuts in government spending 
was economic liberalization programs that became popular around the world after 
the neoliberal turn in 1980s. This has been a very popular theme of studies focusing 
on social policy in the region. A study of Jordanian neoliberal transformation by 
Baylouny (2008) points out the contraction of welfare provision as a result of 
structural adjustment policies, but also the expansion of military and other security 
services. Prior to neoliberal reforms, social policies of the regime were an important 
source of political legitimation and it had a considerable base of support in the 
                                                          
35 See Rana Jawad (2008). Social Policy in the Middle East. Retrieved from Social Policy Association: 
http://www.social-policy.org.uk/policyworld/PolicyWorld_Spr08.pdf p.10  
 
36 See Massoud Karshenas & Valentine M. Moghadam. (2006). Social Policy in the Middle East: 
Introduction and Overview . In M. Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, Social Policy in the Middle East: 
Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics (pp. 1-30). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p.3.  
 
37 Ibid p.4 
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society. After the reforms, Baylouny (2008) argues, the military and people benefiting 
from this expansion have replaced the old base of support.38  
Another popular theme in this literature has been the religious welfare provision. 
Islamic social movements constitute an important element of the social and political 
landscape of the region. Similar to political regimes, a significant source of support 
for them is welfare provision to poor people. Jawad & Yakut-Çakar (2010)39, Jawad 
(2009)40, and Dean and Khan (1997)41 provide comprehensive descriptions of 
religious dynamics of welfare provision in the region. This literature has developed 
mainly as a reaction to the dominant rentier state arguments to explain the welfare 
effort dynamics in the region. They mainly argue that rentier state framework cannot 
capture the complexity of welfare provision dynamics in the Middle East and the 
broader set of actors involved in the process welfare.42 They draw attention to non-
state actors who are motivated by their religion to improve the welfare of poor in 
their society. While religious welfare literature do a good work in terms of expanding 
the scope of welfare studies, they fail to combine their cultural elements with political 
ones and to generate a more comprehensive framework that accounts for both 
political and non-political dynamics of welfare provision in the region.   
Another group of works consists of individual case studies. They generally employ a 
historical or cross-sectional perspective, and describe the problems of social policies 
in the countries. A comprehensive work on the social policy in Egypt by Bayat (2006) 
surveys the changes in social policies from the period of Nasserist socialism to 
                                                          
38 See Anne M. Baylouny. (2008). Militarizing Welfare: Neo-liberalism and Jordanian Policy. Middle 
East Journal, 62(02), 277-303. 
 
39 See Rana Jawad & Burcu Yakut-Çakar. (2010). Religion and Social Policy in the Middle East: The 
(Re)Constitution of an Old-New Partnership. Social Policy & Administration, 44(06), 658-672. 
 
40 See Rana Jawad. (2009). Social Welfare and Religion in the Middle East: A Lebanese Perspective. 
Chicago, Il: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
41 See Hartley Dean & Zafar Khan. (1997). Muslim Perspectives on Welfare. Journal of Social Policy, 
26(02), 193-209. 
 
42 See Rana Jawad. (2009). Social Welfare and Religion in the Middle East: A Lebanese Perspective. 
Chicago, Il: The University of Chicago Press, p.14.  
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neoliberal transformation after 1990s.43 Among other notable examples of this 
literature are the works on Tunisia by Romdhane (2006)44, on Algeria by Layachi 
(2006)45, and on Morocco by Ennaji (2006)46.  
This work differs with its interest in region-wide dynamics of welfare efforts, its 
emphasis on political factors, and its systematic comparative technique. While most 
of the studies offer particularistic explanation for each case, this work will attempt to 
make at least a modest generalization about the determinants of good and poor 
welfare efforts.     
 
1.4. Conclusion 
 
The discussion of the three issues in this chapter primarily indicated the intricacy of 
militaristic aspects’ influence on political economic performances of states. The 
search for a simple linear relationship in the literature has produced contradictory 
results. This work differs from the dominant quantitative tradition in the literature, 
and attempts to bring a less ambitious explanation that is not generalizable to all 
contexts.  
In most of the Middle Eastern countries, along with limited economic capacities, 
nature of political regimes seems to be the most significant constraint on social policy 
making. The phenomenon of militarism that constitutes a significant pillar in most of 
these regimes is popularly cited among the foremost of those constraints. This 
                                                          
43 See Asef. Bayat (2006). The Political Economy of Social Policy in Egypt. In M. Karshenas, & V. M. 
Moghadam, Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics (pp. 135-
154). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
44 See Mahmoud Romdhane. (2006). Social Policy and Development in Tunisia since Independence: a 
Political Perspective. In M. Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, Social Policy in the Middle East: 
Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics (pp. 31-77). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
45 See Azzedine Layachi (2006). Algeria: Crisis, Transition and Social Policy Outcomes. In M. 
Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender 
Dynamics (pp. 78-108). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
46 See Moha Ennaji. (2006). Social Policy in Morocco: History, Poitics and Social Development. In M. 
Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, Social Policy in the Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender 
Dynamics (pp. 109-134). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
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qualitative study analyzes which combinations of militaristic aspects and some 
relevant contextual characteristics might lead to good or poor welfare efforts. With 
these features, it could be counted as a member of literature on political economy of 
militarism, politics of social policy and social policy in the Middle East.    
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Chapter 2 
Research Design and Methodology 
 
 
2.1. Middle East as a Regional Unit 
 
What makes the Middle East a regional unit like Latin America or Central Asia are 
many common cultural, social, and political characteristics shared by the countries in 
this part of the world. Due to the colonial background it connotes, the reality of this 
conception is contested47 and discredited by some scholars.48 Nevertheless, there are 
significant practical advantages to defining Middle East as a regional unit for making 
inter-regional and intra-regional comparisons.  Although, a region named as the 
Middle East did not exist before the 20th century or the late 19th century, today most 
of the social researchers, international organizations, and multinational firms treat 
the Middle East as a separate regional unit. The main discussion regarding the status 
of the Middle East revolves around its boundaries, that is, whether countries like 
Turkey, Iran, or even Pakistan could be treated as Middle Eastern countries. However, 
the most common definition includes only the Arab majority countries.  
Almost all the countries in the Middle East region are populated predominantly by 
Muslim and Arab people. Their emergence as nation states has been a result of the 
First World War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire in its aftermath, and many of 
them underwent military coups after the Second World War prior to being fully 
institutionalized nation states. To make meaningful comparative analysis of social 
events or phenomena on certain units of analysis like states, regions, or social 
                                                          
47 See Roderic H. Davison (1960, July). Where Is the Middle East? Retrieved from Foreign Affairs: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/71575/roderic-h-davison/where-is-the-middle-east 
 
48 See Hassan Hanafi (1998, August). The Middle East, in whose world?. Retrieved from UIB: 
http://www.org.uib.no/smi/pao/hanafi.html  
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movements, a sufficient similarity in terms of contextual characteristics should exist 
among the members of a certain population.49 Given the social, cultural, and political 
characteristics shared by most of the Middle Eastern states, they provide a 
convenient set of cases for applying a comparative method.    
While all the countries resemble each other in many characteristics, they also have 
significant differences between them. Particularly, in terms of the political 
institutions that structure policy making in these countries there are quite different 
examples. Roughly, two types of political systems exist in the region. First, there are 
monarchies which are ruled by traditionally powerful families and which lack formally 
institutionalized functioning of politics. Second, there are authoritarian republics 
where exist elections and parliaments. However, they do not function effectively to 
translate the democratic will of the people into policies. While some states fall only 
into one of these two categories, some share the characteristics of both. For example, 
Saudi Arabia does not have any republican political institution and the traditionally 
influential Saud Family rules the country, therefore it is a pure example for the first 
type. There are countries such as Egypt and Syria where no monarchical institution 
exists, but their political structures shows strong authoritarian characteristics. 
Countries such as Jordan and Morocco share some features of both types. They have 
kings at the top of the political hierarchy, but they also have parliaments, which could 
have an influence in policy making.  After the upheavals in the recent period, Tunisia 
has gone beyond this classification by achieving a social contract that is likely to 
relieve the destabilizing effects of social cleavages in the society, therefore it could 
no longer be classified within the rows of monarchies or authoritarian republics. 
However, our study covers a time period within the period before the upheavals, and 
in that period Tunisia, under the rule of Ben Ali, was among the ideal examples of 
authoritarian republics.  
Depending on the research question, including all the Middle Eastern states in an 
analysis might not be useful, and it could be necessary to exclude irrelevant cases. If 
abovementioned political characteristics are relevant for the subject matter of a 
                                                          
49 See Charles C. Ragin (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press, p.14. 
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study, and if they are not the mainly focused explanatory variables, then it could be 
better to choose a subgroup from this Middle Eastern population of states. In this 
study, mainly the relationship between militaristic characteristic of states and their 
welfare efforts are being investigated. For having a sufficiently homogenous set of 
cases in terms of contextual characteristics, it is better not to include the states, 
which have monarchical political economic structure. What monarchies have in 
common is the enormous income they derive from the export of oil and natural gas, 
and small populations compared to the rest of the region. Thanks to their excess 
financial resources and their rentier political economic structures, they are able to 
implement very generous welfare policies over their relatively small populations. 
Beyond basic needs such as health and education, some countries even provide free 
or subsidized housing and food. These generous benefits that could not be 
experienced to this extent in other parts of the world has led to the framing of a new 
welfare state type remembered with the Gulf states.50 Since the critical issue in this 
study is the trade-off policy makers face while allocating resources for different policy 
domains, the Gulf countries, which overlap with the set of full monarchies as well, 
will not be included in the analysis.  
When the Gulf states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates—are excluded from the study there remain the countries to the west 
of the Arabian Peninsula, and Yemen which is located in the southern shores of the 
peninsula but does not share the same political economic characteristics out of the 
lack of natural resources. Among these remaining countries, some countries do not 
collect or reveal data about their political economic performances, characteristics, or 
outcomes. Among them are Libya, Sudan, Palestine, and Iraq. What all these 
countries share in common is the weak institutionalization of their political economic 
systems, and even arguably they could be defined as failed states. They either do not 
have the institutional capacity to collect data, or they prefer not to reveal the data 
because of the widespread corruption. Given these conditions, these four states also 
                                                          
50 For some examples of welfare efforts in Gulf countries, see Sharifa Alshalfan. (2013). The right to 
housing in Kuwait: An Urban Injustice in A Socially Just System. Retrieved from London School of 
Economic and Political Science: http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/kuwait/documents/The-
right-to-housing-in-Kuwait.pd 
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will not be included in the study. After excluding the Gulf Countries and these four 
states, eight states remain for conducting a comparative analysis. These countries are 
respectively Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.  
When compared with the standards of the developed and emerging world, these 
eight countries considerably resemble to each other in terms of their political, 
economic, and social development levels. However, when a deeper attention is 
devoted exclusively to them they exhibit a remarkable variation on the outcome of 
interest, namely the welfare effort, and on the factors that might be relevant for the 
explanation of variations on the outcome. In general, all are militarist countries, but 
they vary in degree. The difference becomes more evident when the phenomenon of 
militarism is disintegrated into its components. These features makes this sample of 
cases a convenient one for applying a comparative method. Following sections of this 
chapter will be dedicated to a specific type of comparative method, which this study 
will benefit, and the detailed explanation of the outcome variables and the condition 
variables that are expected to explain the outcome of interest.    
 
2.2. Methodology 
 
As social research has become more sophisticated through the decades, some 
methodological traditions have crystallized with their distinctive view of social reality 
and different data collection techniques. The main split has occurred between the 
qualitative and quantitative traditions. Qualitative researchers commonly assume a 
complex social reality for which a generalization across time and space is hardly 
achievable, and they usually attempt to explain their subject matter with many 
factors whose various combinations might be a recipe of a certain outcome. This 
qualitative tradition, although not as systematical as its recent form that developed 
in the last decades51, has been the most common way of dealing with the social 
                                                          
51 For a prominent example of attempts to make qualitative research more systematic, see  
Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, & Sidney Verba. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference 
in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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phenomena in disciplines such as political science, sociology and cultural studies. 
Quantitative tradition, on the other hand, assumes a more linear and a simple 
conception of causation in the social life, and researchers who embrace a 
quantitative position usually have a desire to make exact conclusions about effects 
of each factor on the outcome.52    
These two traditions have different templates for comparative research. The 
conceptualization of the split as case oriented (qualitative) vs. variable oriented 
(quantitative) research makes this distinction more salient.53 A qualitative 
comparative study generally takes a single or several cases relevant to its issue of 
interest, and conducts a systematical comparison either between cases, or between 
a case and a theoretically ideal situation. Each case embodies a certain combination 
of characteristics, and any characteristics, which are designated as variables in 
quantitative research, is not meaningful out of this combination. Given this, final 
conclusions are made about cases, in other words, about the configurations of the 
characteristics. Causality is assumed to be context dependent. Therefore, a 
characteristic might or might not lead to an outcome depending on the other 
characteristics consisting the context of a case.   
In the variable oriented template, variables are abstracted from the context of cases 
and they are treated as context independent. If an analysis proves a significant effect 
of an independent variable, by assumption this variable is expected to produce its 
effect in any context, that is, not depending on the values of other variables. In this 
template causality is additive, but not configurational. The total effect on dependent 
variable is the sum of effects by each significant independent variable. If an outcome 
that is expected to be produced by a certain significant variable is not observed, then 
it is because of the dominance of effects by other significant variable(s) that have an 
effect on the dependent variable in the opposite direction.  
                                                          
52 For a detailed comparison of qualitative and quantitative templates, see Charles C. Ragin. (2013). 
New Directions in the Logic of Social Inquiry. Political Research Quarterly, 66(01), 171-174. 
 
53 See Charles C. Ragin. (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press. p.23. 
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As the name of these traditions suggests, while quantitative methods always make 
use of numbers and mathematical symbols as a language for making sense of the 
social reality, qualitative methods rarely resort to numbers, but predominantly 
dependent on the verbal language which is more capable to penetrate into the 
complexity of the characteristics and relationships between them. The use of 
numbers in the former template arises the problem of measurement. Being able to 
make a quantitative analysis, aspects of the social reality should be translated into a 
mathematical language, and a scale of measurement should be available. Most of the 
time, it is hard to find a directly measurable social phenomenon, but it is achieved 
through indicators that are considered to approximate to the reality of the 
phenomenon. This feature is widely criticized by the followers of the qualitative 
tradition, because they argue this translation leads to a significant loss in the meaning 
of concepts through which scholars make sense of the social reality.  
Although it is sometimes argued the split between qualitative and quantitative 
traditions is only a stylistic one54, indeed there are some insurmountable gulfs 
between the two traditions. The abovementioned difference regarding the initial 
assumption they make on the nature of causality is hard to disregard. However, there 
have been some attempts to find a way between the two and achieve a greater 
capacity of explanation both through penetrating to the complexity and being able 
to make generalizations across time and space. The most common way has become 
the use of a mixed strategy that uses both methods in one study.  A particular and 
more sophisticated attempt has been undertaken by Charles C. Ragin with his 
method of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). This one offers a synthetic 
technique that to a certain extent achieves to incorporate some advantages of the 
two traditions into a single methodology. This work will benefit from Ragin’s method, 
and the next section will give a more detailed picture of the QCA as an approach and 
a technique. 
 
                                                          
54 See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, & Sidney Verba. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. p.3. 
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2.2.1. Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
QCA is a result of Ragin’s efforts to offer an alternative template for social research, 
which shares the view of causality of the qualitative tradition and the systematic 
inference making of the quantitative tradition. QCA systematizes the context 
dependent and configurational causality of the qualitative research with the tools 
borrowed from mathematics and logic. It bears the word qualitative, because it is a 
case oriented method. Its final conclusion does not give information about the net 
effects of individual variables on dependent variable. However, different from the 
traditional qualitative methods, its technical aspects enable to include more than a 
couple of cases into a comparative analysis. This feature also helps to achieve modest 
generalization across cases, which is not much possible in the traditional case study 
methods.   
Each case could be viewed as a particular combination of characteristics.55 
QCA translates these characteristics, whose certain qualitative states are termed as 
conditions in the QCA vocabulary, to the language of the set theory and formal logic. 
Each condition constitutes a defining property of a set, and a case is located in the 
intersection set of the conditions whose combination makes up the case. After 
determining the conditions to be included in a study, each case is investigated for 
which conditions are present or not in it. To do that in a systematical way, QCA uses 
truth tables as shown in the Table 2.1. Configurations of conditions are distributed 
along the rows, and each column is assigned for a particular condition. Cases having 
the same configuration share the same row. If a certain condition is present in a 
configuration it takes a value of 1, which represents the presence of that condition, 
and 0 otherwise. The column to the right of condition columns is used for the 
outcome variable, and the same procedure of assigning a number to present its 
absence or presence within the case is run.  
                                                          
55 See Charles C. Ragin. (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press. p.16.  
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The truth table makes it easier to understand the general picture of a causal 
relationship in the social reality for a sample of cases. It matches configurations that 
are embodied by cases, with outcomes. If there are cases sharing the same 
combination then it is investigated whether they share the same outcome. When this 
situation arises for a handful of cases, it is possible to make significant conclusions 
about the causal relationship between a configuration and the  outcome. There could 
be more than one configuration that consistently produce the outcome of interest or 
consistently not produce. This is called multi-conjunctural causality or equifinality in  
 
Table 2.1: A truth table example 
 
 
the qualitative tradition.56 The QCA systematizes this kind of explanation to the social 
phenomena. After constructing this truth table, and making explicit the various 
configurations leading to the presence or absence of the outcome, a formula that 
expresses the causal relationship is generated.  The expression summarizing the 
above truth table would be as follows:  
 
                                      A*B*C*D    +    A*b*C*D    =    OUTCOME, 
                                                          
56 See James Mahoney, & Gary Goertz. (2006). A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and 
Qualitative Research. Political Analysis, p.236.  
 
 Condition A Condition 
B 
Condition 
C 
Condition 
D 
 
Outcome 
Number 
of Cases 
Configuration 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 
Configuration 2 1 0 1 1 1 2 
Configuration 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Configuration 4 1 0 0 1 0 3 
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A*B*c*D    +    A*b*c*D    =   outcome, 
 
Here the two expressions describe the paths to the presence or absence of the 
outcome. The symbol * represents the AND operation of the formal logic, and the 
symbol + represents the OR operation. The upper case letter means the condition 
represented by the letter or the label is present, and vice versa if the letter is lower 
case. The last step is minimizing this expression to achieve a more parsimonious 
explanation. It is processed by an algorithm built in the fsQCA software which is 
provided by Ragin.57 
In the truth table above, the absence or presence of conditions and outcome are 
coded respectively with the numbers 0 and 1. This kind of representation permits 
only to translate dichotomous qualitative states. This way of dealing with the data is 
called crisp set QCA. It is based on a binary logic that is only able to describe 
dichotomous qualitative states of conditions and outcome. The language and 
operations of the Boolean algebra is utilized to summarize and make operations on 
the data. Sometimes this way of dichotomous analysis do not suffice to describe the 
categories of characteristic and to explain the relationships between them. For 
example, to include the GDP per capita variable as an explanatory condition in a 
study, one should define two dichotomous qualitative states of it. For this variable, 
these two conditions would be high GDP per capita and low GDP per capita. However, 
in most cases it would be very spurious to classify countries as either a high or low 
income country. To overcome this problem, two different QCA techniques have been 
developed. The first one is multivariate QCA (mvQCA) in which conditions could be 
defined with respect to more than two qualitative states. In mvQCA the income level 
of a country, that is measured with the GDP per capita,  would be able to defined as 
low, medium, or high, and if required more qualitative states could be added 
between the extremes of low and high. In mvQCA, the outcome variable is still 
                                                          
57 Information and download links for the software could be reached through the following link: 
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml 
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defined dichotomously. This variant of the QCA is mostly preferred when a crisp set 
QCA technique produces contradictory results. Therefore, mvQCA may resolve the 
contradiction by letting more variation for one or more conditions. The other variant 
is the fuzzy set QCA which differs from the first two in terms of the level of 
sophistication in translating and analyzing the raw data. In this study, this variant will 
be utilized as the method of inference making, therefore it deserves an exclusive 
focus.  
As its name suggests, it is built on fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory, which enables to 
go beyond the binary nature of classical logic and crisp sets. In fuzzy sets an object 
does not have to be either a full member or full non-member of a set, but it could 
have a degree of membership and non-membership to it. When this is applied to QCA 
a qualitative state could be observed with a degree of presence and absence in a 
case, and the case could have a degree of membership or non-membership to the set 
defined by a certain condition. The state of full membership and full non-membership 
are respectively coded as 1 and 0, and the values between these two extremes are 
assigned to the objects or cases that are neither full member nor full non-member of 
a set. For example, if fuzzy logic is applied to the set of high income countries, a 
country such as Mexico will be less member of this set than the United States. While 
the US would have a fuzzy set membership score close to 1, the Mexico would 
probably have a score around 0.5, which denotes the state of ambiguity between the 
two extremes. The subset relationship between fuzzy sets is the critical property for 
establishing a causal relationship between a configuration, which corresponds to the 
intersection set of conditions making it up, and the set defined by the outcome. When 
a case’s membership score to the former becomes lower than the latter, a subset 
relationship is constituted and if this relationship holds consistently true across cases, 
then a causal relationship could be defined. In fsQCA there are some confidence 
measures for the reliability of the causal relationship. Consistency and coverage 
measures are the two ways introduced by Ragin for achieving a greater level of 
sophistication in fsQCA analysis.58 The consistency measure indicates how 
                                                          
58 See Charles C. Ragin. (2008). Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. p.45.  
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consistently the fuzzy subset relationship is observed across cases, and the coverage 
measure indicates in what portion of a sample of cases a certain consistent 
relationship is observed. Table 2.2. and Table 2.3, facilitates to understand the 
concepts regarding fsQCA and the procedures of conducting the analysis.  
Table 2.2 illustrates a hypothetical example of assigning fuzzy set membership scores 
of cases to the combinations of conditions. In this example there are five cases and 
three conditions. There are eight possible combinations of conditions in Table 2.2, 
because the number of combinations for three conditions is 23. The fuzzy score of a 
case’s membership to a combination is the lowest membership score this case has 
among the three conditions. For example, for the first combination A*B*C, in which 
all conditions are present because they are written in capital letters, case 1 has a 
membership score of 0.2 , because among the three conditions C is the one which 
this case is the least member with a score of 0.2.  After applying this procedure for all  
 
Table 2.2. Fuzzy Set Membership of Cases in Combinations of Conditions 
 
Case 
A B C A*B*
C 
A*B*
c 
A*b*
C 
a*B*
C 
A*b*
c 
a*B*
c 
a*b*
C 
a*b
*c 
 
 O# 
1 0.7 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.6 
2 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 
3 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.8 
4 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.3 
5 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 
             
Note: # The letter “O” represents the outcome variable 
 
cases and combinations, a fuzzy truth table could be constructed based on the 
threshold level that determines the criterion for a combinations’ inclusion into the 
truth table. The most common value is 0.5, which represents the state of ambiguity 
in terms of membership to a set. A value above this number means a case is a more 
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member than non-member to a set, and vice versa when the value is below this 
number. The truth table below is derived from the above table, and it enables to 
illustrate the causal relationship in a functional form.  
 
Table 2.3. An example of Fuzzy Truth Table 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
Number 
of Cases 
 
Outcome  
Consistency 
1 1 1 1 1 1.000000 
1 1 0 1 1 0.928571 
0 1 1 1 0 0.888889 
1 0 1 1 1 1.000000 
0 0 1 1 0 0.705882 
 
 
Through this truth table a solution of the analysis in the form of a functional 
expression of the causal relationship could be written. It will be the most complex 
solution if any assumption is not made for the logical remainders to which no 
empirical case corresponds. When there are many logical remainders, it would be 
better to include them into the analysis to produce a more parsimonious solution. 
They could be assumed to produce or not produce the outcome of interest based on 
a theoretical or substantive knowledge. This example is a hypothetical and simple 
one, but it helps to understand the basics of fsQCA analysis that will be applied to a 
more complex data in the next chapter.  
 
2.3 Explanans and Explanandum 
 
The outcome of interest in this work, as mentioned many times before in the text, is 
welfare efforts by the Middle Eastern states. The broadest definition of the concept 
has to do with any policy and programs implemented by states to increase the well-
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being of their society through providing benefits and securing them against the risks 
of social life. However, the scope and extent of the definition is disputed in the 
literature and there is not a standard aggregate measure agreed upon by researchers. 
There are some indicators such as the social expenditure and the social security 
coverage that are popularly used to approximate the level and quality of welfare 
efforts, because they correlate significantly with the outcomes that are widely 
considered to be the results of welfare efforts by states, i.e. the human development, 
the social development etc. This work, as well, will use these two indicators as 
outcome variables, in other words as explananda.     
Aspects of militarism observed in the political economic structures of the subject 
countries will constitute the main explanatory factors of the study. That does not 
necessarily means they are the ultimate, or fundamental factors of the variation in 
terms of welfare efforts by Middle Eastern states, but this work will specifically focus 
on their effects on this outcome. Sometimes all militaristic aspects might be present 
in a configuration, which corresponds to a specific case or more than one cases, while 
other times some or none of them might correspond. Since this study is not a 
quantitative one, the net effects of individual variables will not be available as a 
conclusion, but only how these militaristic aspects combine with each other and with 
other contextual variables to produce a certain outcome.  
The most salient feature of a militaristic political economy is extravagant military 
expenditure, which could be measured through dividing it by GDP or the central 
government expenditure. This work will prefer the second option out of the assumed 
trade-off between different components of the central budget. Other militaristic 
aspects included in this study are the high ratio of military personnel in total 
employment, and a highly interdependent relationship between the military elite and 
central government regarding their survival, which could be observed in many cases 
to a varying degree.  
In addition to these central variables, this work will include contextual variables, 
which are considered to be relevant to the emergence of the outcome of interest. In 
political economic literature GDP per capita is almost a sine qua non factor whose 
effect should be investigated. Among the other factors comprising the political 
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economic context of states, some relevant ones are government effectiveness, the 
ratio of public sector employment to the total employment, and foreign military aid. 
All these factors will be introduced below in more detail.  
 
2.3.1. Outcome Variables 
 
This work will conduct two fsQCA analyses. One with the social expenditure as the 
outcome variable, and the other with the social security coverage as the outcome 
variable. Below, a more detailed description of these two variables is given.  
 
2.3.1.1. Social Expenditure 
 
While welfare effort is the most widely used independent variable to explain the 
overall quality of a state’s social policy or to explain welfare state development, it is 
most commonly operationalized as social expenditure as a percentage of GDP.59 
However, in this study the concept of welfare effort will be operationalized as social 
expenditure as a percentage of the central government spending, because the central 
issue is the trade-off between different components of the state budget. The fuzzy 
set for this outcome will be defined as high social spending, and the country having 
the highest raw value for this variable will get a fuzzy score close to 1, and the country 
having the lowest raw value will get a fuzzy score close to 0. Therefore, this analysis 
will take into account the relative difference among them, but not the differences 
relative to a universal standard.  
 
 
                                                          
59 See Ricardo Alaez-Aller, & Pablo Diaz-DE-Basurto-Uraga. (2013). Beyond Welfare Effort in the 
Measuring of Welfare States. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 15(03), 
p.275. 
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2.3.1.2. Social Security Coverage 
 
Another measure for approximating the level of welfare effort is the social security 
coverage. The definition of this indicator is borrowed from the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). It gives information about how many of the ten branches60 of 
social security counted in the ILO’s extended definition for social security are covered 
by a state. Based on this measure countries are distributed into four categories 
ranging from comprehensive social security to very limited statutory provision. In this 
study, a case belonging to the highest category will get a fuzzy score of 0.95, and it 
will descend respectively to 0.65, 0.35 and 0.05 for lower categories.     
 
2.3.2. Explanatory Variables 
 
As stated before, explanatory variables are presented in two groups: those related 
with the main focus of the study, namely militarism, and contextual variables that  
might be relevant for the qualitative variation of the outcome. 
 
2.3.2.1. Militaristic Aspects 
 
Military expenditure 
 
This work is not an analysis simply measuring the correlation between the military 
expenditure and social expenditure. The qualitative nature of the study suggests the 
causality should be configurational, and therefore the explanation should be like a 
                                                          
60 These ten branches defined by the ILO are as follows: protection in sickness, medical care, income 
support in the form of cash sickness benefits, protection in disability, protection in old age, 
protection of survivors in case of a death of a breadwinner, protection in maternity, protection in 
responsibility for the maintenance of children, protection in unemployment, protection in case of 
employment injury, general protection against poverty and social exclusion. 
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recipe61 that presents causal paths to a certain outcome. Such a recipe that primarily 
focuses on the ingredients pertaining to the militaristic characteristics of political 
economies for offering the map of causal paths to better welfare efforts should 
include military expenditure as the foremost aspect of militarism.  Given there is not 
any country that could be labeled militarist without excessive military expenditure 
either as a percentage of GDP or of central government expenditure, how much 
states spend on their militaries will constitute a component of explanatory 
configurations.  
As in the case of social expenditure, this aspect of militarism will be measured as a 
percentage of central government expenditure. The country having the highest ratio 
will get a fuzzy score of 0.95, while the lowest one will get a score of 0.05, and the 
other countries will score between these two extremes.  
 
Military Personnel 
 
The extreme concern of being prepared for any potential war is another important 
feature characterizing a militaristic state. Even though modern militaries are more 
dependent on weapons for warring capacity, the need for human resource is still at 
considerable levels. In low levels of technological development this need is even 
higher, and when combined with a militaristic culture the amount of personnel 
recruited by the military might constitute a substantial portion of the total 
employment.  
A high amount of people supplying wage-labour for the military might lead to an 
overburden on the state budget, and constrain the ability of the central government 
to spend on welfare of the society. However, this aspect of militarism might also have 
an increasing effect on the level of overall welfare provision, because the exhaustive 
and risky nature of the military profession force governments to guarantee a 
relatively comprehensive welfare scheme to military men. Therefore, a high amount 
                                                          
61 See Charles C. Ragin. (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press. p.52.  
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of people serving for the military also means a high amount of people benefiting from 
comprehensive welfare schemes. In a nutshell, this aspect might affect the outcome 
of welfare efforts in two directions.  
While assigning a fuzzy membership score to each case, the country with the highest 
ratio of military personnel over the total employment will be given the highest value. 
It will be scored 0.95, which means it has almost full membership to the set of 
countries with high ratio of military personnel in total employment. On the other 
hand, the country with the lowest ratio will get the score of 0.05, which corresponds 
to almost non-membership to this set.  
 
Military Government Relationship 
 
In advanced democracies, even in those exhibiting some militaristic characteristics, 
the military usually does not enjoy a dominant status within the political economic 
structure of the country, unless there is an unusual circumstance in terms of the 
perceived external threat. However in non-democratic and militarized political 
economies military generally occupy a central place, and governments might feel 
constrained by this dominance. Governments suffering from a shaky state of political 
legitimacy might depend on the military for their survival, and the military elite also 
might depend on the government consent for the sustainment of their dominant 
position. At its extreme levels this interdependent situation embodies the definition 
of praetorianism in which the rulers depend on the protection by the military men 
for political survival, and the former enjoy an exclusive status.     
The relationship between the governments and the militaries in the Middle Eastern 
countries differ in terms of praetorian characteristics. While a country like Syria could 
serve as a typical example of this phenomenon, a country like Tunisia could hardly be 
counted as an example. The degree of praetorianism in other countries included in 
the study lie between these two extremes. Table 2.4 assigns fuzzy scores to each case 
based on the knowledge in the literature regarding the nature of the relationship 
between the two parties. 
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Table 2.4. Fuzzy Scores for the Condition of Military-Government Relationship  
 
Country 
Fuzzy 
Score 
 
Explanation 
Algeria 0.7 In its post-colonial era, Algeria has usually been remembered with 
the excessive role of the military in politics. In the last decade, its 
praetorian hold over the government has been curbed to a certain 
extent, but it is still among the highly militarized polities in terms of 
the civil-military relations.62  
Egypt 0.6 Although the military has marched towards the center of the politics 
after the coup in the summer of 2013, it was not that interfering 
before the Arab Spring period. It had achieved a somewhat 
organizational independence from the government and the two 
were not feeling their fates were much tied to each other’s behavior.  
Jordan 0.7 Jordan’s military is weakly institutionalized, and high ranked 
positions are generally occupied by the close relatives or trusted 
men, however this patrimonialism is not as extreme as in the case of 
Syria. The regime has other sources of legitimacy that makes it less 
reliable on military relative to the Syria for its survival. 
Lebanon 0.4 After the civil war the military has no longer been an influential actor 
in politics. The political cleavages emanating from the religious or 
ethnic differences reverberated to the institution of military as well, 
and various factions’ struggle for it prevents its emergence as a 
strong institution seeking its interests through politics.63   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62 For a detailed discussion, see Rachid Tlemçani. (2007, June). Bouteflika and Civil Military Relations. 
Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/08/19/bouteflika-and-civil-military-relations/fgku 
63 See Aram Nerguizian. (2011, November). Lebanese Civil-Military Dynamics: Weathering the 
Regional Storm? Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for Peace: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/21/lebanese-civil-military-dynamics-weathering-regional-
storm/7nsz 
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Table 2.4. Fuzzy Scores for the Condition of Military-Government Relationship 
(Continued) 
Morocco 0.4 Moroccan army has been under great control of the monarchical 
establishment, and relative to many countries in the region it could 
be classified as a subordinated to the ruling establishment. The 
coup attempts in the past has become unsuccessful and paved the 
way for its being controlled closely, however there has not been a 
substantive level of 64 
Syria 0.9 Syrian military has been the most extreme case in terms of centrality 
as an actor in politics. Its behavior since the beginning of the protests 
and during the three years of civil war has indicated the 
interdependence between it and the government for their survival.   
Tunisia 0.2 Tunisia has had the most subordinated military in the region. This 
feature has also been very influential for a successful collapse of the 
old regime and for a smooth transition period after it. In a nutshell, 
its behavior since the beginning of the Arab Spring process has 
confirmed its subordination and the weakness of interdependence 
with the government.  
Yemen 0.7 In Yemen the military has been perceived as a significant threat by 
the Saleh regime, and therefore the latter had a considerable effort 
to establish a praetorian unit within the military with personnel from 
the family of Ali Abd’allah Saleh.65  
 
 
2.3.2.2. Contextual Variables 
 
Any policy emerges as a result of intricate relationships between numerous 
components of a political system. However, some features of them become more 
                                                          
64 See International Business Publications. (2011). Morocco: Foreign Policy and Government Guide. 
Washington DC. 
65 See Michael Knights. (2013). The Military Role in Yemen's Protests: Civil-Military Relations in the 
Tribal Republic. Journal of Strategic Studies, 36(2), p.262. 
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fundamental in determining the outcome. In political economies where the military 
officials have a dominant position over policy making processes, abovementioned 
militaristic features are expected to play such a fundamental role towards certain 
outcomes. The presence and direction of the effect imposed by these fundamental 
variables might depend on the context they exist. For instance, in a context of high 
level of gross national income, these militaristic features might impose a negligible 
constraint on welfare efforts by states. In this section, some relevant contextual 
variables will be introduced that might be effective to change the effect of militarism 
variables.  
 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
 
A simple juxtaposition of any indicator of welfare effort and income level reveals the 
parallelism between the two.66 The most widely used indicator for the income level 
of a country is GDP, and GDP per capita is the version adjusted for the size of 
population. GDP per capita is the foremost contextual variable expected to be 
relevant towards the outcome of interest. A meaningfully higher GDP per capita in a 
case compared to another one might make it more able to finance comprehensive 
welfare programs and social security schemes since more financial resources will be 
available for the government through the inflow of tax revenues and public 
enterprise profits.  
The eight countries in this study do not vary very much in terms of that indicator. 
There is not any high income country among them, but they are either lower or 
middle income countries. However, at lower income levels, small differences might 
matter much than at higher levels. Assignment of fuzzy scores to the cases for that 
variable will be undertaken based on the relative differences between them. 
Therefore, the country having the highest GDP per capita among the eight will get a 
                                                          
66 See The International Labour Organization. (2011). World Social Security Report 2010/11: 
Providing Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond. Geneva. Retrieved from 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_213759.pdf, p.3.  
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fuzzy score close to 1 which represents the state of almost full membership to the set 
of countries having a high GDP per capita, and the country on the other extreme will 
get a fuzzy score close to zero.  
 
Government Effectiveness 
 
Middle Eastern nation states have long been suffering from state weakness in terms 
of being independent from external influences in making and executing policies 
particularly out of the legacy of a stillborn state building process. This factor has 
become a critical barrier in front of the economic and political development. The 
measure of government effectiveness produced by the World Bank has been a good 
indicator for the success of policy making process and its outcomes. It is defined as 
“perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies”.67  Although Middle Eastern countries share a common backwardness in that 
feature compared to the standards for the developed world, they differ among 
themselves, and there are some countries approximating to the developed world. 
This factor could be a significant one towards the level of welfare efforts by the states. 
The logic is simple, countries achieving more effective policies in overall sense are 
expected to achieve more effective welfare policies as well.   
The raw data for that condition has a range from -2.5 to 2.5, which respectively might 
be translated as full government ineffectiveness and full government effectiveness. 
Eight states included in the study do not have scores close to these two extremes. 
Given this fact, while the raw scores are converted into fuzzy set membership scores 
the range will be narrowed to the interval between -1.5 and 1.5.  
 
                                                          
67 See Worldwide Governance Indicators. (n.d.). Retrieved from The World Bank: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports 
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Public Sector Employment 
 
Economic development of the Middle Eastern states has been highly dependent on 
public sector and this is pronounced among the primary factors of not being able to 
achieve the economic potential.68 This has been partly a result of the socialist policies 
in the early processes of state formation in the second half of the 20th century, and 
partly a result of the quest for control over the means of production for preventing 
the emergence of a strong capitalist class independent from the regime that might 
one day threaten the authoritarian structures of political economies.  
In the eight Middle Eastern countries where the economy is dominated by the public 
sector, a great share of the labor force is employed by the state institutions or public 
enterprises. While in some cases this share hits extreme values, in some others it 
takes more modest values. In less developed countries of the globe, as the ones in 
this works, many people enjoy welfare benefits and social security programs through 
their employment in the public sector. The persistent problem of informality in the 
private sector leaves many people without any financial support from the state for 
social protection and development purposes. Similar to the other variables, the 
highest fuzzy score, which will be close to 1, will be assigned to the country having 
the highest ratio of public employment within the total employment.      
 
Foreign Military Aid 
 
Middle East was among the areas of Cold War struggle between the US and the USSR. 
These two states were scrambling in the region to form alliances with the newly 
emerged nation states such as Egypt and Syria. After the end of the Cold War, the 
interest of the US for the Middle East persisted, and even increased. It has mobilized 
a great amount of resources to be used in the region for security purposes. This 
included financial and military aids to some of the countries. For example, Egypt has 
                                                          
68 See Dimitris Tsitsiragos. (2013, December). Private sector key to development in Middle East, 
North Africa. Retrieved from Al Monitor: http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/private-sector-key-develop-middle-east-north-africa.html# 
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been benefiting an aid around $1.5 billion annually, and most of it has been provided 
in the form of military equipment. When the amount of the aid is significantly high, 
it might be expected to relieve the burden of the military on the state budget. States 
getting no military aid will get a fuzzy score of zero, for that variable, while the 
country with the highest foreign military aid will get a fuzzy score of 0.95, which 
means it is almost a full member to the set of countries benefiting high amount of 
aids from the US.  
 
2.4 Data Sources 
 
This study benefits from various sources for measuring the aforementioned 
outcomes and relevant conditions towards them. In this section these sources and 
the properties of the data they provide will be introduced very briefly before 
conducting the analysis in the next chapter.   
For the outcome variables, namely the social expenditure as of central government 
expenditure and social security coverage, the data provided by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) will be utilized. The former one is measured by the ILO as 
a percentage of GDP69, therefore an additional information regarding the share of 
central government spending in GDP will be required to measure the outcome of 
interest in this study. Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom70 includes 
government spending as a variable, and it provides data about that indicator. The 
data for the other variable, social security coverage, is provided in the World Social 
Security Report 2010/11 published by the International Labour Organization.71 
                                                          
69 See Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP. (n.d.). Retrieved from International 
Labour Organization: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=E-1c 
 
70 See Index of Economic Freedom. (n.d.). Retrieved from Heritage Foundation: 
http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year 
 
71See The International Labour Organization. (2011). World Social Security Report 2010/11: Providing 
Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond. Geneva. Retrieved from 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_213759.pdf, p.32. 
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For each condition variables related with militarism a different procedure of 
producing the raw data will be carried out. The military expenditure will be measured 
as a share of the central government expenditure. The most renowned institution 
measuring this indicator is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), and its data on military expenditure will be compared to the Heritage 
Foundation’s government expenditure data. For the condition variable of military 
recruitment, World Bank’s indicator of armed personnel as a percentage of total 
labor force will be used72. Any coherent information is not available for the 
characteristics of military-government relationship, but it is possible to classify the 
degree of the interconnectedness of their fate based on the knowledge in the 
literature and the information revealed after the recent historical events in the 
region.  
Data for GDP per capita is available from various sources, but this work prefers World 
Bank’s measure.73 Government effectiveness is an indicator exclusively measured by 
the World Bank as a part of its Worldwide Governance Indicators project.74 As 
mentioned previously, it is originally measured between -2.5 and 2.5, but for a 
healthier conversion to fuzzy scores the range will be narrowed to -1.5 and 1.5. Public 
sector employment data will be borrowed from a working paper published by the 
IMF in 2013. It is given as a ratio of private sector employment, but since the two 
makes up the total employment, it is possible to calculate the public employment as 
a percentage of total employment. Lastly, data on the foreign military aid variable 
will be taken from the U.S. Department of State.75  
 
                                                          
 
72 See Armed Forces Personnel (% of Total Labor Force). (n.d.). Retrieved from The World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.TF.ZS  
 
73 See GDP Per Capita (Current US$). (n.d.). Retrieved from The World Bank: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
74 See Worldwide Governance Indicators. (n.d.). Retrieved from The World Bank: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports 
 
75 See Foreign Military Financing Account Summary. (n.d.). Retrieved from U.S. Department of State: 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm 
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Chapter 3 
QCA Analysis of Militarism and Welfare Efforts in the Middle East 
 
 
This chapter constitutes the core of the study where the empirical data is analyzed 
through a systematic method of comparison. The procedure will be guided by the 
fuzzy set version of the QCA method. In the first section, raw data for condition and 
outcome variables will be presented in a table, and then will be converted into fuzzy-
set membership scores based on the criteria determined in the previous chapter. In 
the following section the results of the fsQCA analysis, which are executed by the 
software Charles C. Ragin provides 76, will be presented and interpreted. In the last 
section of the chapter some crucial cases will be discussed based on the results of the 
analysis to achieve a deeper understanding of the relationship.  
 
3.1. Raw Data and Conversion Procedure 
 
Except for the condition variable of military government relationship (milgov) and the 
outcome variable of social security coverage (soccov), data about any condition or 
outcome variable in this study is not available in the fuzzified form. In this section, 
firstly the raw data and details about their measurement are presented and then the 
table including fuzzified version of the data is constructed.  
Table 3.1 includes the raw data for 8 cases, 7 conditions and 2 outcomes. As long as 
the raw data are available, values have been measured as average of five years from 
2006 to 2010. This interval covers a time period before the eruption of recent 
upheavals that created a new political context. For other variables, the values in the 
table belong to years for which data were available within this period. Details about 
                                                          
76 The software is called fsQCA 2.0 and could be downloaded from the following link:  
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml 
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the exceptions and other important information are given in footnotes. After 
constructing this table, the next step is fuzzifiying these values, so that the fsQCA 
technique could be applied. To convert these values into fuzzy scores the calibrate 
operation built into the software is used.  
 
Table 3.1. Raw Data For All Variables 
 
Notes:   
1 GDP per capita values present the average of five years from 2006 to 2010 and they are in current 
U.S. 
2 For some cases, public sector employment data does not belong to 2010, but to years close to 2010. 
For more information about the raw data on this variable see the previous chapter. 
3 Foreign military aid is measured in millions of U.S. dollars and belongs to 2010. 
4 milgov is already in the fuzzified form, because its values are not assigned based on a pre-measured 
raw data, but given in this table, so that it includes all the variables. 
5 Social expenditure as of government expenditure data belongs to the year 2011  
 
In the below functional expression, the input “name” corresponds to the label of 
variable, and the following inputs x1, x2 and x3 correspond to the raw data values that 
respectively determines the upper bound of the membership status, the ambiguous 
state for membership, and the lower bound of the membership status.   
 
 
Case gdppc 1 govefc pubsec2 foraid3 milexp milper milgov4 socexp5 soccov 
Algeria 4028 -0,55 33 0 12.593 2.98 0.7 24.094 0.9 
Egypt 2130 -0,37 28 1300 6.862 3.44 0.6 38.841 0.7 
Jordan 3587 0,20 24 300 13.694 7.12 0.7 33.544 0.1 
Lebanon 7039 -0,36 16 100 12.736 5.28 0.4 3.274 0.7 
Morocco 2611 -0,13 9 9 14.724 2.14 0.4 8.935 0.7 
Syria 1919 -0,70 29 0 17,077 7 0.9 8.628 0.1 
Tunisia 3976 0,40 10 15 5,067 1.28 0.2 38.060 0.9 
Yemen 1236 -0,95 12 0 9,306 2.3 0.4 8,462 0.3 
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calibrate (name, x1, x2, x3) 
 
To give an example, the fuzzification of the values for government effectiveness 
variable is conducted as in the functional expression below. Firstly the variable 
labelled govefc is inserted, and then respectively 1.5, 0, and -1.5, the values 
representing the upper bound, state of ambiguity and the lower bound for 
membership, are replaced with x1, x2, and x3. After inserting these values, the 
function produces fuzzified version of the raw data as the output.     
              
           calibrate (govefect, 1,5 , 0, -1,5)   
  
Table 3.2 includes the output of the above function for all condition and outcome 
variables. Since QCA is a method based on set theory, conditions and outcomes are 
defined as sets, and their defining property is made up by a theoretically determined 
qualitative state. The result of the analysis associates certain combinations of these 
qualitative states with outcomes that represent a certain qualitative state too. For 
instance, the variable pubsec in Table 3.2 represents the condition of high public 
sector employment within the total employment. A case’s degree of membership to 
this set is determined by the degree it displays the condition of high public sector 
employment. Therefore, as the value a case has for the pubsec increases, the degree 
of public sector employment observed in that case increases. If the case was defined 
as low level of public sector employment, then it would be vice versa. This logic 
applies to other variables as well in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.2 Fuzzy membership scores of cases to conditions and outcomes 
caseid gdppc govefc pubsec foraid milexp milper milgov socexp soccov 
Algeria 0.45 0.25 0.95 0.05 0.62 0.33 0.7 0.62 0.95 
Egypt 0.12 0.32 0.85 0.95 0.11 0.39 0.6 0.94 0.65 
Jordan 0.35 0.6 0.68 0.23 0.73 0.93 0.7 0.88 0.05 
Lebanon 0.93 0.33 0.22 0.08 0.64 0.72 0.4 0.05 0.65 
Morocco 0.18 0.44 0.05 0.05 0.82 0.23 0.4 0.12 0.65 
Syria 0.1 0.2 0.88 0.05 0.93 0.93 0.9 0.11 0.05 
Tunisia 0.44 0.69 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.2 0.94 0.95 
Yemen 0.06 0.13 0.1 0.05 0.27 0.25 0.4 0.11 0.35 
 
 
3.2. Causal Models and FsQCA Analysis 
 
In this section of the chapter, results of the analysis produced by the software using 
the truth table algorithm will be presented. These results will indicate how militarism 
related conditions combine with each other and with contextual variables to produce 
the two outcomes that are both used as proxies for good welfare effort.  
Prior to presenting analysis results, a brief review of the procedure executed by the 
software should be given. The fsQCA software applies the truth table algorithm on 
data to produce the functional expressions that depicts the causal relationship 
between conditions and the outcome. After entering the fuzzified data into the 
software, an outcome variable is specified and variables that are considered to 
explain the variation on it are defined as conditions. In fuzzy set QCA, each possible 
configuration of conditions represent a corner in the vector space. The amount of 
corners are same with the amount of rows in a crisp set QCA analysis. For example, if 
four conditions are included in the analysis, then the possible configurations are 24. 
That means there will be 16 corners in the vector space, each corresponding to a 
possible configuration. Each case has a membership to every corners, but with 
varying degrees. The corner to which it has a membership score greater than 0.5 – 
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the value representing the state of ambiguity for membership in fuzzy set language— 
consists a row of the truth table as the configuration that is observed in a case.  
After applying this criterion for each case, a crisp set truth table is obtained. After 
each case is assigned to a certain configuration of conditions, the next step is 
determining if the outcome is observed in the case displaying this certain 
configuration. The consistency measure is used to decide the presence or absence of 
the outcome in a case by providing information about the subset relationship 
between former and the latter on which the inference of causality is based in set 
theoretical methods.  A threshold for consistency is chosen, and cases having a 
consistency score greater than that threshold for the subset relationship between 
their configuration and the outcome are determined to display the outcome. In this 
study the consistency threshold is chosen as 0.8 which is the default score defined in 
the software, therefore the cases having a consistency score above 0.8 have been 
given the score of 1 for the outcome for representing its presence, and the score of 
0 for absence.  
The last step of the analysis is producing the logical expression that illustrates the 
paths to the presence or absence of the outcome. It is obtained through the Quine 
McCluskey minimization algorithm. It enables to eliminate the spurious conditions 
from combinations by determining those conditions whose presence or absence does 
not matter for the outcome. The below example basically illustrates how this 
algorithm proceeds.  
                                             
A*B*c*D   +   A*B*C*D   +   A*B*C*d   +   A*b*C*d   =   O     (1) 
 
This hypothetical expression has four conditions represented with letters A, B, C, D, 
and the outcome represented by the letter O.  Capital letters correspond to presence 
of a condition, and small letter to the absence of a condition. There are four 
combinations that display the outcome, but they could be reduced to two with a basic 
logical minimization operation.     
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A*B*D*(C + c)   +   A*C*d *(B + b)   =   O        (2) 
           A*B*D   +   A*C*d   =   O                        (3) 
 
Expressions (2) and (3) are logical equivalents of (1). In the first two combinations of 
the expression (1) the condition C is present in the second one (A*B*C*D) and absent 
in the first one (A*B*c*D). The other three conditions are all present in both 
combinations. Therefore, it means the presence or absence of C does not matter for 
the emergence of the outcome, so it could be eliminated and the two combination 
could be reduced to ABD. The same reduction is applied to the third and fourth 
combinations, and consequently the minimized expression (3) is obtained for the 
symbolic representation of the causal relationship. This procedure is applied by the 
software to the data, but mostly the problem of limited diversity constraints to make 
effective minimizations and to produce a parsimonious explanation. To overcome 
this problem, combinations that are logically possible but not having an empirical 
correspondence are included to the analysis with counterfactual assumptions that is 
a common practice in qualitative tradition.77  
In this study there are two outcome variables, therefore there are two causal models 
of the relationship. The first model uses high social expenditure as the outcome, and 
the second one uses comprehensive social security as the outcome. This way of 
explanation with two outcomes is preferred, because data for social expenditure 
variable might be flawed for some cases. For example, in International Labour 
Organization’s database Lebanon’s social spending as of its GDP in 2011 is reported 
as 1.12%.78 This is a value which sounds unreasonable given the fact that social 
security coverage in this country is classified as semi-comprehensive, which is the 
                                                          
77 See Charles C. Ragin & John Sonnett (n.d.). Between Complexity and Parsimony : Limited Diversity, 
Counterfactual Cases, and Comparative Analysis. Retrieved from University of Arizona: 
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/download/Counterfactuals.pdf 
 
78 See Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP. (n.d.). Retrieved from International 
Labour Organization: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimaps.mapIndicator2?p_indicator_code=E-1c 
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second best category.79 Data for the social security coverage seems more compatible 
with the general landscape of social policies in the region. Thus, an analysis with these 
two models could help to make a sounder conclusion. If similar solutions are obtained 
with two different indicators, that could help to achieve a higher degree of 
robustness for causal claims.   
The software produces three different solutions for the analysis of data with each 
models, including the complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions. The 
complex solution is the functional expression which is produced only with the 
configurations corresponding to an empirical case. There are eight cases in this study, 
and the complex solution is obtained by applying the minimization algorithm only on 
those cases which display outcome among the eight. The parsimonious and 
intermediate solutions are generated with the inclusion of logical remainders – 
combinations of conditions that are not embodied by any empirical case. These 
combinations are included into the analysis by making assumptions on whether they 
display the outcome or not.80 For the parsimonious solution, the software makes its 
own assumptions about the conditions so that it could produce the functional 
expression with least possible amount of condition variables. However, for the 
intermediate solution assumptions are made by the researcher based on theoretical 
or substantive knowledge.  
The output in Table 3.3 includes the intermediate solution for the model 
having high social security expenditure as the outcome. The counterfactual 
assumptions that are benefited for the inclusion of logical remainders are given 
below the table.  Based  on  these  assumptions  the  intermediate  solution  indicates  
                                                          
79 See The International Labour Organization. (2011). World Social Security Report 2010/11: 
Providing Coverage in Times of Crisis and Beyond. Geneva. Retrieved from 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_213759.pdf, p.32. 
80 For two good examples of using counterfactuals in an empirical analysis, see: Olav Schram Stokke. 
(2004). Boolean Analysis, Mechanisms, and the Study of Regime Effectiveness. In A. Underdal, & O. 
R. Young, Regime Consequences: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies (pp. 87-119). 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic,   and 
Barbara Da Roit & Bernhard Weicht. (2013). Migrant Care Work and Care, Migration and 
Employment Regimes: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis. Journal of European Social Policy, 469-486. 
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Table 3.3. Analysis of Causal Paths to High Social Expenditure* 
* Counterfactual assumptions:  milgov (absent), milexp (absent), FORAID (present),  GOVEFC (present),  
GDPPC (present) 
 
three paths to the outcome of high social expenditure in the Middle East. The 
frequency cutoff was set at 1, because the number of empirical cases are limited. It 
has a satisfactory level of consistency with 0.866071, which describes the extent of 
causal paths’ membership to the set of outcome. It is measured in a scale ranging 
from 0 to 1. While the lower bound denotes full non-membership, the upper bound 
denotes full membership. A value close to 1 is acceptable for establishing causal 
connection between configurations and outcome.  
The first combination associates high public sector employment and low level of 
armed forces personnel as of total employment with high social security spending. 
This result is in line with the hypothesized effects of these two conditions. Based on 
the membership scores of cases to the set defined by the intersection of these two 
conditions, Algeria and Egypt are the two cases displaying this configuration. They 
have membership scores greater than the state of ambiguity represented by 0.5, or 
in other words, their scores are greater than the most common threshold used to 
determine membership status of a case to a set. The substantive meaning of this 
    
                                                                                                raw             unique                
                                                                                           coverage      coverage     consistency   
                                                                                            ----------         ----------         ----------    
 milper * PUBSEC                                             0.432361      0.175066      0.881081  
   
 PUBSEC * GOVEFC                                          0.408488      0.151194      0.855555  
 
 milgov * milper *                                            0.445623      0.188329      0.844221 
milexp * GOVEFC     
 
       solution coverage: 0.771883  
       solution consistency: 0.866071 
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causal path is that the similar outcome in the two cases could be explained with the 
combination of high public sector employment rate, and low armed forces personnel 
rate, and the rate of military expenditure and the nature of civil military relations are 
not relevant to this outcome.  
The second result does not require the presence of any militaristic aspect for the 
emergence of the outcome, but the third one includes all aspects of militarism and 
associates their absence with the outcome of high social expenditure.  While the 
second configuration is displayed with a degree of membership greater than 0.5 by 
the cases of Jordan and Tunisia, the third one is only observed in the case of Tunisia. 
Since the two combination have different number of conditions, Tunisia’s 
membership in two different combinations has become possible. The similar 
outcome in Jordan and Tunisia could be explained with high government 
effectiveness and high public sector employment.  
Overall, this solution suggest contextual variables such as GDP per capita and foreign 
military aid do not lead to a qualitative difference in the outcome variable of social 
expenditure. On the other hand, the other five variables combine in three ways 
towards the emergence of high social expenditure, or in other words good welfare 
efforts in regional standards. Effective use of resources and good governance, 
measured as government effectiveness, seems to be an important predictor of high 
social spending.    
The output in Table 3.4 presents the solution for the negation of the socexp, that is, 
low social expenditure. Similar to the first output it has a satisfactory degree of 
consistency with 0.848718, however the four configurations designated as the paths 
to the outcome are too complex to make a meaningful conclusion about 
contributions of each variable to the emergence of the outcome. A fair conclusion is 
that the presence of militaristic aspects, but not the absence of them, combining with 
other conditions toward the low social expenditure supports the hypothesized 
relationship between the three militaristic conditions and the welfare efforts. While 
this solution does not give a result that supports the opposite of hypothesized 
relationships, it is hard to make assertive causal claims about the trueness of  
hypotheses.    
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Table 3.4. Analysis of Causal Paths to Low Social Expenditure* 
* Counterfactual assumptions: MILGOV (present),  MILEXP (present),  foraid (absent),   govefc (absent),  
gdppc (absent)  
 
The solution for the second model, soccov as the outcome variable, is presented in 
Table 3.5. This solution with a frequency cutoff of 1 and a 0.988235 degree of 
consistency, indicates two paths to the outcome of comprehensive social security 
coverage. The fsQCA analysis of the model with soccov apparently has greater level 
of explanatory capability due to the higher level of consistency and having a more 
parsimonious expression as the intermediate solution.  
In this solution, only three out of seven condition variables are found to be relevant 
for the emergence of the outcome. The first configuration specifies the absence of a 
praetorian relationship (milgov) combined with the absence of high level of military 
personnel (milper), and the second one combines the  absence of milper with the 
presence  of  high  public  sector  employment. Morocco  and  Tunisia  are  the  two  
      
                                                                                                 raw             unique                
                                                                                            coverage      coverage   consistency   
                                                                                             ----------         ----------        ----------    
   MILEXP * foraid *                                          0.304965      0.037825     0.865772 
pubsec * govefc * gdppc 
              
   MILGOV * MILEXP *                                      0.505910      0.238771      0.826255 
foraid * govefc * gdppc 
                   
   MILPER * MILEXP *                                        0.356974      0.134752      0.883041 
foraid * pubsec * govefc  
            
   MILGOV * milper *                                         0.347518      0.104019      0.913044 
foraid * pubsec * 
govefc * gdppc      
 
        solution coverage: 0.782506  
        solution consistency: 0.848718  
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      Table 3.5. Analysis of Causal Paths to Comprehensive Social Security Coverage* 
*Counterfactual assumptions: milgov (absent), milexp (absent),  FORAID (present),  GOVEFC (present),  
GDPPC (present)  
 
countries having a degree of membership greater than 0.5 to the first one, and the 
second one is observed with a degree of membership greater than 0.5 in the cases of 
Algeria and Egypt. Similar to the solution for the first model, this one does not find 
the contextual variables GDP per capita and foreign aid as relevant to the outcome, 
but additionally the government effectiveness and the military expenditure are 
added to the array of these irrelevant variables. 
 Based on this solution, it could be argued that high public sector employment and 
low degree of militaristic aspects enable these Middle Eastern states, which have 
limited economic capacity, to allocate more resources for welfare efforts, as 
measured by social security coverage.   
The output for the last analysis in which the outcome is the negated version of the 
soccov, is given in Table 3.6. It suffers from a low level of consistency with 0.755611, 
and similar to the second output it provides a very complex explanation. Therefore, 
commenting on the relationship between the condition variables and the outcome 
of very limited statutory provision (soccov) based on this analysis could be 
misleading.  
       
                                                                                  raw              unique                
                                                                              coverage       coverage      consistency   
                                                                                ----------          ----------           ----------    
milgov * milper                                   0.646512       0.360465       0.985816  
 
 milper * PUBSEC                                 0.420930       0.134884       0.978378  
 
       solution coverage: 0.781395  
       solution consistency: 0.988235 
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Table 3.6. Analysis of Causal Paths to Very Limited Statutory Provision   
* Counterfactual assumptions:  MILGOV (present),  MILEXP (present),  foraid (absent),  govefc 
(absent),  gdppc  (absent) 
 
In a nutshell, the fsQCA analysis of the data that is conducted with two different 
outcome variables supports the arguments that associates militarism with poor 
welfare efforts,  and more generally with poor  political economic outcomes. The 
configurations associated with good welfare efforts in Table 3.3 and Table 3.5 include 
the absence of militaristic aspects, and those associated with poor welfare efforts 
include the presence of these aspects. In conclusion, the absence or presence of 
militaristic aspects are found to be relevant for a qualitative difference in the 
outcome of interest, and in line with the hypothesized relationship. However, out of 
several reasons the results presented in this chapter should be treated as suggestive 
evidence for the negative relationship between the militarism and welfare efforts. 
Firstly, the conversion of the raw data values into fuzzy set membership scores was 
      
                                                                                         raw              unique                
                                                                                     coverage       coverage    consistency   
                                                                                      ----------          ----------         ----------    
   MILEXP * foraid *pubsec                    0.345946      -0.000000     0.859060 
* govefc *gdppc  
        
   MILPER * MILEXP * foraid                       0.383784       0.075676      0.830409 
* pubsec * govefc           
 
   MILGOV * milper * foraid                     0.367568       0.102703      0.844721 
* pubsec * govefc * gdppc 
      
   MILGOV * MILPER * MILEXP                        0.513513       0.294594       0.871560 
 * foraid * pubsec * gdppc         
 
       solution coverage: 0.818919  
       solution consistency: 0.755611  
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carried out based on regional standards, that is, the scores reflect the relative states 
of cases for each condition and outcome variables. Therefore, this explanation could 
not be valid for all regional contexts. For example, GDP would probably be a 
significant factor to explain the qualitative variation across all countries in the world, 
but it is irrelevant when the focus is narrowed to the Middle Eastern context where 
there is not much variation in terms of economic capacity.  Secondly, the designated 
causal paths to the outcomes were in such parsimonious level thanks to the inclusion 
of the logical remainders by making counterfactual assumptions about some 
condition variables. This is a common practice in qualitative tradition and in QCA 
methods, and is carried out on a theoretical or substantive basis. Finally, a challenging 
task faced by researchers of the Middle East is the lack or flaws of the data. Countries 
do not reveal their information for being able to measure many political, economic 
or social indicators, and institutions resort to estimations based on their models. 
However, sometimes this practice might lead to unreasonable measurements as 
mentioned previously in this chapter for Lebanon’s social expenditure level. Despite 
these limitations, the analysis offers an exploratory introduction to the guns vs. 
butters tradeoff between financing the militarism and welfare efforts. It might serve 
as a preliminary examination before a more sophisticated study that is supported 
with more empirical cases and more reliable data.  
 
3.3 A Special Focus on Three Cases: Syria, Tunisia and Egypt 
 
In this section of the chapter a brief examination of three cases will be carried out. A 
specific comparison of Egypt, Tunisia and Syria might help to achieve a better 
understanding of the relationship. Syria is the case having the worst outcome in terms 
of welfare efforts, and Tunisia is the one having the best. While Syria allocated 8.62% 
of its central government budget on social spending, in Tunisia this value was 38.05% 
in 2011. Additionally, social security coverage in Syria is qualified as very limited 
statutory coverage, but Tunisia has a comprehensive coverage. 81 This strong contrast 
                                                          
81 Values for social spending and information for social security coverage are obtained from Table 3.1  
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in outcome variables are matched with a strong contrast in many condition variables. 
Egypt shares some conditional characteristics with Syria and Tunisia, but it displays a 
far better outcome than Syria both in terms of social expenditure and social security 
coverage. This part will attempt to solve this puzzle to a certain extent by employing 
a specific focus and benefiting the results of the fsQCA analysis.   
 
3.3.1. Syria 
 
Syria is an extreme case for the phenomenon of militarism not only in its region, but 
also in the world. The Global Militarization Index (GMI) published in 2010 ranks it 
third after Israel and Singapore.82 Situated in one of the most conflictual parts of the 
world, the size of its military has been legitimized in the eyes of a considerable 
portion of its society. The tension with Israel and sometimes with Lebanon helped 
the regime to sustain an extreme level of mobilization. However, it was not only the 
external threats that helped the regime to channel a great amount of resources to 
the military, also the uneasy relations with some societal groups rendered the 
military a praetorian unit serving for the security of the regime.  
Since its early formation period, Syria has been suffering from a failure to unify under 
a single national identity.  The Baath Regime’s efforts to this end were carried out 
through the security apparatus and in the form of violent repression or threats of 
violent repression.83 Those who tried to promote their non-Arab identity or religious 
identity as a reaction to Arab nationalist policies of Baath regime has amounted to a 
considerable portion of society. Nationalist ambitions in the face of major opposition 
and governmental weaknesses, both before and after Hafez Al Assad, got the regime 
stuck into a legitimacy crisis. The regime’s response to these challenges has been 
strengthening its military muscle against its people. This situation has not been 
                                                          
 
82 The GMI could be reached through the following link for years from 1990 to 2012:  
http://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=gmi-new 
 
83 See Raymond Hinnebusch (2008). Modern Syrian Politics. History Compass. 6(1), p.264.   
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observed uniformly across all authoritarian contexts. Some authoritarian regimes 
achieved to derive legitimacy from economic or cultural factors like the abundance 
of natural resources or representing a major ethnic or religious group in the political 
realm. Syria, in contrast, does not have abundant resources that could let the regime 
to establish a rentier state, and the regime rarely lets the members of Sunni majority 
to compete for positions in state offices and military. The sectarian attitude of the 
regime that favored Alawite minority over the Sunni majority, reverberated in the 
military, as well. Most of the higher positions in the military ranks were held by the 
people from this minority. Regime’s dependence on military for its survival and 
military elites’ dependence on the regime for keeping their privileges created a 
symbiotic relationship between the two, which has become crucially harmful for 
political and economic development of the country. 84  
The militarism observed in the Syrian case is almost a pure example for Vagts’ 
definition85, that is, the extreme level of mobilization transcends true military 
purposes, but serves to the non-military purposes like the survival of the regime. It 
could not be described only with the size of military and praetorian characteristics, 
but also the diffusion of military priorities across all arts and industries. It has the 
highest scores for all three militarism variables, and the lowest score for most of the 
contextual variables. This extreme state of militarism and poor political economic 
indicators offer a plausible explanation for the very poor performance in welfare 
efforts. Beyond that, one additional aspect that could not be included in the study is 
the power structure of the regime.  
The survival of the regime in the recent turmoil has proven the significance of the 
distinct position of the military in the political structure. Among the most compelling 
explanations of the failure and success of revolts in terms of toppling the 
authoritarian regimes has been built upon the variation in the structure of militaries 
and the nature of their relations with the heads of the regime across Middle Eastern 
                                                          
84 See Itamar Rabinovic. (1972). Syria Under the Baʻth, 1963-66: The Army Party Symbiosis. Tel Aviv: 
Israel Universities Press, p.3.  
 
85 See Alfred Vagts. (1959). A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military. New York: Meridian Books. 
P.13.   
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countries.86 In Syrian case the symbiotic relationship between the military and 
government made military willing to repress the revolts, and this factor has become 
very decisive for the failure of opposition movement until now. However, another 
component of the regime has also been decisive to this end. The business networks 
that enjoy privileges in the market competition thanks to their close ties with the 
regime constitute another pillar of the resilience of the status-quo.87 The first one 
generates legitimacy through a militaristic culture and the recruitment of a large 
amount of people by the military. The business networks, on the other hand, creates 
a sense of economic liberalization on a section of the society benefiting from the 
contraction of the public sector.88 
In authoritarian contexts one common motivation behind generous welfare provision 
is the politically legitimizing effects it generates. This nature of the Syrian regime 
relieves the pressure on it for deriving legitimacy through welfare provision. The so 
called Arab Spring events has shaken the structure of the regime, but the repressive 
apparatus has achieved to sustain the status-quo. In the immediate future, it seems 
the persistence of this political economic structure will be a barrier in front of 
effective welfare efforts and other political economic outcomes.  
 
3.3.2. Tunisia 
 
The popular upheavals in the last few years have spread from west of the region 
towards its eastern parts, but the only success story until now has been the country 
where the upheavals first sparked, namely Tunisia. Among the primary factors 
producing this outcome were the different characteristics of the political structure of 
                                                          
86 See Eva Bellin. (2012). Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: 
Lessons from the Arab Spring. Comparative Politics, 44(2), 127-149.  
 
87 See Bassam Haddad. (2011). Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian 
Resilience. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press. p.5.  
 
88 See Bassam Haddad. (2012). Syria, the Arab Uprisings, and the Political Economy of Authoritarian 
Resilience. Interface, 4(1), p.118. 
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this country. These features were also the underlying reasons for the relatively more 
successful political economic outcomes in the previous decades.  
There is not very much thing to tell about Tunisian military and its role in Tunisian 
political economy, because since the rise of Habib Bourguiba to the power in late 
1950s it has been gradually subordinated by him, and shrank in size. As a result, it has 
become an insignificant actor in politics and economy. This feature of Tunisian 
political economy, even not achieved with democratic intentions, differentiated 
Tunisia among the authoritarian countries of the Middle East in terms of political and 
economic outcomes. Today, Tunisia scores the least values in all three militaristic 
aspects included in this study, and also it has the best score in terms of government 
effectiveness, and a fair level of public sector employment. Its GDP per capita score 
is not the highest one, but as the fsQCA analysis has indicated, differences in GDP per 
capita did not matter significantly to the end of good welfare efforts.  
Tunisia has the highest scores for both indicators of welfare efforts. Since 
independence social policy has had a strong emphasis in governments’ agenda and 
through decades the level of provision has consistently increased even during periods 
of structural adjustment in the economy that most of the time exerts great pressure  
 
Table 3.7.  Aggregate Indicators of Welfare Efforts in Tunisia 1986-200289 
Years Total Public Social 
Spending * 
Social Spending/GDP 
(%) 
1986 2881.8 18.9 
1990 3495.4 19.5 
1994 4035.1 19.4 
1998 4867.3 19.3 
2002 5860.8 19.5 
                                        * Values are measured in millions of 2002 dinars 
                                                          
89 See Mahmoud B. Romdhane. (2006). Social Policy and Development in Tunisia since 
Independence: a Political Perspective. In M. Karshenas, & V. M. Moghadam, Social Policy in the 
Middle East: Economic, Political, and Gender Dynamics (pp. 31-77). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
P.64.  
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on governments to cut public spending. Table 3.7  shows total public social spending 
and social spending as a share of GDP between 1986 and 2002. This table gives an 
idea about the level of provision across time. The values illustrate the commitment 
of the governments to achieve consistent performance in welfare efforts. The 
political aspects of the regime lying under this relatively better performance of 
Tunisia are the low level of budgetary pressure exerted by the military and effective 
governance and use of resources. In stark contrast to Syrian case, Tunisian regime 
chose to subordinate the military establishment to increase the security of the 
regime, but instead expanded the police force. However, compared to the military, 
the police force is a low cost alternative for internal security.  
The politically legitimizing aspect of welfare provision that lacks in the Syrian case has 
become a central motivation of the authoritarian rulers of the country.90 Interestingly 
the recent upheavals initiated in Tunisia, and primarily out of the miserable 
socioeconomic conditions. Although, the statistics draw a brighter landscape for 
Tunisia, the eruption of these events arises the question how egalitarian were the 
welfare efforts implemented.   
 
3.3.3. Egypt 
 
Despite Egypt is closer to Tunisia in terms of the outcomes of social expenditure and 
social security coverage, it is closer to Syria in many of the conditions of the models 
presented in this study. This fact makes it an interesting case that deserves a specific 
elaboration.  In fact, any study dealing with the Middle East cannot ignore this case, 
because it has the biggest population and provides a rich history of events, and a 
complex social and political setting to test hypotheses.   
In the two solutions presented in the previous section, Egypt embodies the 
configuration of high level public sector employment and low level of armed forces 
personnel towards the outcomes of high social expenditure and comprehensive 
                                                          
90 Ibid. p.33. 
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social security coverage. This explanation makes sense given the fact that Egyptian 
private economy suffers from weakness and insistent problem of informality. In 
Egyptian private sector it is very hard for an employee to find a job that provides 
social security coverage, but it is the public sector jobs that offer social security 
coverage. When this combines with statist policies and the strategy of deriving 
legitimacy through job creation in the state offices and enterprises, the relationship 
between the high public sector employment and relatively better welfare efforts 
becomes clearer. Additionally, the low level of military personnel that proxies a low 
level of military burden on the central budget enables the government to channel 
resources to be used more in implementing social policies.  
One distinct feature peculiar to Egypt that the solution of the fsQCA analysis cannot 
capture is the commercial operations of the military establishment in markets. After 
the coup d’état in the July 2013, this market empire has drawn more attention. It is 
estimated that the Egyptian military has 35 factories that operates in non-military 
industries such as chemical, home appliances, food production etc.91 Beyond the 
military’s presence in private markets as the owner of manufacturing and service 
sector companies, another form of influence by the military in markets is the 
appointment of high rank military officials to high managerial positions in public and 
private firms.92  
Military establishment’s adventures in the economy started in the early periods of 
state formation under Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rule. Military was an actor of the state’s 
expansion in the economic realm through nationalizations or founding new public 
enterprises. During Anwar Sadat’s rule the military’s economic power was contracted 
a little, but with Mubarak’s rise to power it returned to the game more powerfully. 
An odd reality from this period was the fact that one of the main beneficiaries of 
                                                          
91 See Zeinab Abul-Magd. (2012, February 9). The Generals’ Secret: Egypt’s Ambivalent Market. 
Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2012/02/09/generals-secret-egypt-s-ambivalent-market/fdc9 
 
92 See Zeinab Abul-Magd. (2013, October). The Egyptian Military in Politics and the Economy: Recent 
History and Current Transition Status. Retrieved from CHR Michelsen Institute: 
http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4935-the-egyptian-military-in-politics-and-the-economy.pdf 
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Mubarak era private sector expansion was the military.93 They were quite 
comfortable with the new neoliberal policies, because the actors of private sector 
was dwarfed by the military in terms of financial capacity to exploit the opportunities 
of economic liberalization. 
Military’s operations in markets might be affecting Egyptian rulers’ welfare efforts in 
two different directions. Thanks to the huge revenue it derives from economic 
activities, its burden on the central government budget might decrease and might 
enable government to spend more on welfare. However, it might also be harmful for 
welfare efforts, because the Egyptian military’s economic activities are exempt from 
taxation.  While the average effect of these activities on welfare efforts are not very 
clear, it is hard to claim that these activities are good for the general economic 
performance of Egypt.  
Similar to Tunisia and many other authoritarian cases, the Egyptian regime has been 
in shaky situation in terms of its political legitimacy, and welfare provision has been 
a part of legitimization efforts. Tarek Masoud’s comparative study of the elections in 
Mubarak period and in its aftermath supports this argument.94 His main question 
revolves around the competition between the Mubarak government and Muslim 
Brotherhood affiliated politicians for the votes of the poor people, but also sheds light 
on the fact that the social spending for the poor people during Mubarak era was one 
significant factor behind their consistent electoral support to the regime in successive 
elections.  
In a nutshell, a very high amount of public sector employees combined with a 
relatively less burden imposed by the military seems to be the main reason for Egypt’s 
better position in the Middle East’s social policy landscape. Also similar to Syria and 
Tunisia, it supports the theoretical argument claiming a negative relationship 
between the militaristic aspects and welfare provision.   
  
                                                          
93 Ibid, p.2.  
94 See Tarek Masoud. (2013). The Political Economy of Islam and Politics. In J. L. Esposito, & E. E.-D. 
Shahin, The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics (pp. 89-111). New York: Oxford University Press. 
P.102.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
Nation state formations in the Middle East took place under strong influence of 
military men. When the shadow of colonial powers had begun to fade away in the 
interwar period and particularly after the World War II, big nation states such as Syria, 
Egypt and Tunisia have emerged in the Levant and Maghreb. Traditional rulers were 
replaced by charismatic military men, and those new rulers initiated social, political, 
and economic modernization programs that were intended to achieve swift 
transformation of the social life. The ultimate goal of these ambitious endeavors were 
reaching to the standards of the developed world, but the current landscape of the 
region proves their failure to achieve this end. Massive protests, and conflicts 
between regimes and societal groups have been a defining property for Middle 
Eastern politics for decades, and in recent years some countries have been a stage 
where these conflicts have turned into violent confrontation between state and 
society.  
Development programs of todays’ developed countries in the post-war period had 
strong emphasis on free market principles, democracy and right to social security, 
however military rulers of the new nation states in the Middle East were far from 
embracing these intermediate ends for development. With the help of anti-
colonialist sentiments in their societies, those charismatic military official, such as 
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Houari Boumediene of Algeria, pursued socialist 
and Arab nationalist transformation projects that left many stillborn elements in 
political economic institutions. One accompanying motivation to these ideological 
pursuits were keeping priorities of security policy domain over others. Accordingly, 
the institution of military and its interests have generally dominated others. The 
conflictual environment in the region, and the need for regime security helped 
military to absorb a great share of public resources. When this overburden of military 
combined with stillborn aspects like an inefficient economy suffering from the lack of 
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a strong private sector, and weakness of society against states, successful political 
economic outcomes were hardly achievable.  
The social policy has been one of the mostly suffering domains from the overburden 
of excessive military mobilization in this part of the world. The only way for many 
people to have access to social security and welfare benefits has been to be employed 
by a public institution or a public enterprise. In Middle Eastern countries, states 
recruit significantly higher amount of people compared to the standards of the 
developed world, but still most of the people works in the informal private sector. 
Besides, militaries expenditure on high-tech equipment is extravagant, but they lack 
domestic military industries that could channel military expenditure’s positive effect 
on economic growth, and ultimately on a country’s economic capacity. Sometimes 
they get external financial aid for their military mobilizations, but the problems of 
ineffective public administration and low degree of accountability decreases the 
likeliness of deriving significantly positive contributions to lower the military’s burden 
on economy in general, and more specifically on social policy expenses. These 
contextual characteristic renders militarism bad for welfare efforts of states, and 
ultimately social development of societies.  
This study has dealt with the relationship of conditions having to do with the 
militaristic characteristic of states and welfare efforts, and attempted to reveal 
militaristic dynamics of good and poor welfare efforts in the region. Three aspects of 
militarism were determined as condition variables, and four contextual political 
economic characteristic accompanied them in the analysis. The two outcome 
variables of social expenditure as of central government spending and social security 
coverage have been chosen as indicators of welfare efforts. Results of the fsQCA 
analysis indicated several paths to good and poor welfare efforts, and the 
combinations of conditions mostly included militaristic aspects like high military 
expenditure, high level of armed forces personnel and praetorian relationship 
between government and military. The inclusion of logical remainders to obtain 
modestly generalizable functional expression of the causal relationship eliminated 
some contextual variables like GDP per capita, government effectiveness and foreign 
aid. This result does not mean that these factors do not have any effect on the 
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outcome of interest in this study, but means that they are not too meaningful for the 
explanation of relative performances of the eight states in terms of welfare efforts. 
This qualitative explanation for the variation of welfare efforts among some Middle 
Eastern states does not provide a universal explanation that could be applied to any 
context, but it is only meaningful for the specified context. However, with the same 
methodology but with a different causal model, a more universal explanation is 
possible.  
Future research could use this study as an introduction to the issue of militarism and 
welfare efforts in the Middle East. Sophisticated quantitative works inquiring net 
effects of political characteristics of states on welfare efforts could benefit from it for 
choosing the variables to include in their causal models. Although, as underscored 
before, results of the study are not universal, the same causal model could be applied 
to regions like Latin America and Central Asia, the regions having a similar social and 
political context.   
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